Essays on driving factors of migration: From regional to metro perspectives by Zhang, Yizhou
  
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON DRIVING FACTORS OF MIGRATION: FROM REGIONAL TO METRO 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
YIZHOU ZHANG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION  
 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Agricultural and Applied Economics 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2019 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
 
Doctoral Committee: 
 
Emeritus Professor Geoffrey J. D. Hewings, Chair 
Associate Professor Sandy Dall’erba 
Assistant Professor Peter Christensen 
Assistant Professor Andrew Greenlee  
  
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Tiebout (1956) put forth his influential “voting with their feet” theory that people move 
across regions to match their preferences for the optimal bundle of tax and government services. 
Other previous studies had emphasized the significant impacts of locational characteristics on 
individual moving decisions especially those made by young professional workers (Florida, 2014). 
The issue of migration has important policy implications. On the one hand, policy makers actively 
use region-based policies to attract business activities and high-productivity worker groups that 
are critical for a region’s future growth.  For example, the smart specialization concept calls for 
the promotion of “a local skills base that can facilitate widespread local incremental improvements 
across a range of the region’s economic activities” (McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2015), as it has 
been found that inflows of skills that are related to the existing knowledge base of the region had 
a positive effect on regional economic growth (Boschma et al., 2009). On the other hand, policy 
makers and the public are concerned about mitigating the impacts of socio-economic changes on 
incumbent residents and have enacted policies to protect them from displacement. For example, 
community activists have long been concerned that gentrification might drive up the housing 
values in a community and displace long-term incumbent residents through higher property-tax 
burdens. Several state and local governments have debated or enacted caps on the taxation of 
owner-occupied property as anti-displacement measures. Many policy makers appear to assume 
that long-term homeowners in gentrifying neighborhoods require special tax treatment to prevent 
their displacement.  
The three chapters of this dissertation investigated how people migrate in response to state-
level and intra-metropolitan socio-economic changes. Chapter one uses a Computational General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model of Illinois to estimate a tax policy’s impacts on labor migration as well 
as on the wider state economy. In 2011, the Illinois state government raised individual and 
corporate income taxes as one contribution to easing the problem of short term and longer-term 
fiscal deficits; However, the impact of the tax increase goes beyond state balance sheets and 
contemporary labor statistics since higher taxes may drive corporations and taxpayers out of the 
state, seeking lower tax rates and greater employment opportunities in other locations.  The average 
number of Illinois migrants who moved to other states was 65,100 from 2008 to 2011, but this 
number jumped significantly to 97,947 between 2012 and 2013, one year after the tax increase. 
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To quantify the impact of the 2011 tax increase on migration, Chapter one first estimates 
parameters related to Illinois’s labor market then plug them back to the CGE model. Sensitivity 
checks show that the CGE model has enhanced explanatory power when the labor market 
parameters were estimated rather than borrowed from existing studies of other regions and 
historical periods.  Comparison of the simulations with/out the 2011 tax increase provides an 
approximation of its long-term negative impacts on Illinois regional economy in terms of GRP, 
labor out-migration, total employment, and real wage, although the state government’s income 
increased in the short term.  Moreover, this income gain is temporary because the tax increase has 
shrunk the size of Illinois’s tax base, as a result of the enhanced out-migration of taxpayers. In the 
long run, the state government’s tax revenue will decrease. In addition, the simulation results show 
that the tax increase alone will not quickly change Illinois’s financial standing unless the state 
government allocates a significantly greater share of its revenue to debt repayment.  However, this 
additional allocation comes at a price of aggravating the negative economic impacts of the tax 
increase.  To summarize, policy maker should be cautious of the tension between addressing the 
state’s fiscal responsibility (in hopes of retaining corporate activities as well as lowering the 
interest on bonds) through unilateral changes in tax rates versus reducing the short-run negative 
impact on the economy. 
Chapter two of the dissertation uses a national data to study the tax-induced migration of 
top scientists that are economically important and associated with the fostering of new industries 
and job creation (Zucker et al. 1998; Zucker and Darby 2006). The existing literature on tax-
induced migration (TIM) has a literature gap with important policy implications. By far it has 
mainly focused on the estimation of the average elasticity of migration to taxes but has largely 
ignored the variance around these estimates.  For example, if TIM has a threshold pattern where 
migrants respond only to tax differentials outside an “inertia range,” then small-scale fiscal 
adjustments might not attain the policy goal of skill attraction.   
Chapter two aims to fill this literature gap by investigating the nonlinear effects of taxes 
on migration.  Specifically, it applied a spline regression to the dataset of Moretti and Wilson 
(2017) and observe different nonlinear patterns in the effects of four types of taxes on scientist 
migration. Then it uses bin regression to confirm the statistical significance of observed marginal 
effect variations. The results suggest that personal income tax and research and development tax 
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credit have threshold patterns in their effects on inter-state migration and migration only occurred 
once certain thresholds in tax/credit gaps are met. The inter-state gap of net-of-ATR and R& D tax 
credit need to be respectively greater than or equal to 4 and 10 percentage points to induce 
migration. In contrast, corporate income tax has a linear effect on migration: a one-percent increase 
in tax differentials between two states leads to a fixed percentage increase in the migration flows 
between the two states, as described by an average elasticity. Meanwhile, investment tax credits 
have a stable effect on migration only when the destination state initially has higher credits than 
the origin state. To summarize, chapter two finds salient and distinctively different nonlinear 
patterns in the effects of inter-state tax differences on scientists’ migration.  
Chapter three shifts the focus from socio-economic changes in macro-environment to 
gentrification in local neighborhoods that alters the immediate surroundings of residents. The 
socioeconomic upgrading of gentrifying neighborhoods has been believed to be associated with 
the displacement of its long-term, incumbent residents (Marcuse, 1985). The mechanisms of 
gentrification also predict that renters should face higher displacement pressure than homeowners 
because they face the displacing factors of gentrification like rent appreciation but are excluded 
from the retaining factors such as the expectation of greater housing sales price in the future. By 
far, the empirical literature generally had overlooked the substantial differences between owners 
and renters (Martin and Beck, 2018). The owner-renter displacement incidence has important 
policy implications: If the policy goal is to protect long-term residents in gentrifying 
neighborhoods, then policy makers should prioritize stabilizing the rental markets.  
Chapter three studies the owner/renter incidence difference of gentrification from a novel 
perspective of downward mobility. Ding et al. (2016)  was the first to find that although residents 
with low credit scores and without a mortgage were no more likely to exit gentrifying 
neighborhoods than their counterparts in non-gentrifying neighborhoods, individuals that did move 
out were more likely to move to lower-income neighborhoods. These findings highlight the 
importance of investigating the quality and destination of residential moves as opposed to solely 
studying mobility rates. However, the data of Ding et al. (2016) did not have a direct distinction 
between homeowners and renters thus did not address the potential owner-renter incidence gap of 
gentrification.  
Chapter three overcomes this limitation with a longitudinal dataset, InfoUSA, that contains 
annual information between 2010-2015 of Chicago households’ residential location, owner/renter 
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status, and other demographic characteristics. This paper develops the gentrification-displacement 
literature by investigating how downward mobility is impacted by not only gentrification but also 
housing tenure status. The empirical results confirm that renter migrants have a greater incidence 
of downward movement than homeowners. Renters on average have a 12.2 percentage-point 
higher probability than homeowners to move to a more disadvantaged destination, regardless of 
the gentrification intensity in the origin neighborhood. On the other hand, intensely gentrified 
neighborhoods observe a 5.4 percentage point higher downward mobility than nongentrified 
neighborhoods, renters and owners alike. Although the synergy of housing tenure and 
gentrification can make a difference in downward movement probability as high as 17.6 percentage 
points, their interaction terms tend to be insignificant meaning that the magnitude of the owner-
renter incidence gap is not different across gentrifying and nongentrifying neighborhoods. More 
importantly, As the synergy between gentrification and housing tenure status redistribute renters 
to less advantaged neighborhoods, policy makers and researchers should pay attention to the 
detrimental effects of this residential redistribution on local community development and focus on 
preventing and mitigating the relevant negative consequences. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Section two, three, and four respectively 
lays out the structures of chapters one to three. The figures and tables of each chapter are included 
after their conclusion sections. A reference list of the full dissertation is given at the end of the 
document.  
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CHAPTER 1: FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION-A CAUTIOUS TALE1 
 
ABSTRACT: Many subnational economies are facing severe fiscal stress often generated by the 
devolution of responsibilities that have been accompanied by little devolution of fiscal resources.  
In 2011, the Illinois state government raised individual and corporate income taxes as one 
contribution to easing the problem of short term and longer-term fiscal deficits; opponents of the 
tax increase were concerned about the impacts on labor mobility and the overall state economy, 
as well as the policy’s effectiveness in addressing the state’s financial situation.  These concerns 
provide the foci of the present paper.  Comparison of simulation results with and without the tax 
increase finds that although the policy increases the state government’s income, it also negatively 
impacts the state economy in terms of greater out-migration, lower employment and Gross 
Regional Product, and a smaller tax base in the long run.  Moreover, simulation results show that 
the tax increase will expedite the state’s debt clearance only if the state government significantly 
increases its share of income spent on debt payment, at the price of enhanced negative economic 
impacts. The results provide a cautionary tale for subnational authorities to consider more 
carefully the implications of unilateral changes in tax rates.  
Keywords: Regional Computable General Equilibrium Models; fiscal policies and behavior of 
economic agents; regional migration 
JEL Classification: C68, H31, R23 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Fiscal devolution has become a popular option in many countries in both the developing and 
developing world to address concerns about matching the heterogeneity of local needs with 
available resources.  In the US, state governments have long enjoyed a much greater degree of 
fiscal autonomy and this has generated enormous variations in state-level fiscal policies.  Even 
though the state constitution mandates a balanced budget, Illinois has, for almost two decades, 
avoided this mandate de facto by extensive borrowing and by delaying payment on current account 
bills.  As a result, the Illinois state government has generated a lingering fiscal problem.  In 2009, 
Illinois was ranked among the top 10 states facing the worst fiscal conditions by the Pew Center 
                                                 
1This chapter is reprinted with permission from Zhang, Y., & Hewings, G. J. D. (2019). Fiscal Decentralization – A 
Cautious Tale. Regional Science Policy & Practice, 11,173-87. Copyright 2019 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc 
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on the States.2  For example, in 2010, it had an $11.6 billion current account deficit,3 more than 
half of its projected $27 billion budget for the fiscal year 2010-2011,4 and its pension system was 
severely underfunded.5   To partially address the fiscal problem, the state implemented a tax 
increase; during 2011-2014, the individual income tax rate was raised from 3% to 5%, and the 
corporate income tax rate was increased to 7% from 4.8%.  The expectation was that between 2015 
and 2024, the individual income tax rate would be reduced to 3.75% and corporate income tax cut 
to 5.25%.  From 2025 onward, the individual rate would remain at 3.25% with the corporate rate 
dropping to 4.8%.6  This initiative in itself did not bring in an overall improvement of Illinois’s 
financial conditions because its unpaid bills did not go down but increased from $3.8 billion in 
2011 to $6.50 billion in 2013.7     
However, the impact of the tax increase goes beyond state balance sheets and contemporary 
labor statistics since higher taxes may drive corporations and taxpayers out of the state, seeking 
lower tax rates and greater employment opportunities in other locations.  The average number of 
Illinois migrants who moved to other states was 65,100 during 2008 to 2011, but this number 
jumped significantly to 97,947 between 2012 and 2013,8 one year after the tax increase. 
Labor out-migration impacts a state’s economy in the long run, such as downsizing the 
state’s tax base.  According to Harris and Todaro (1970), migration is driven by regional 
differences in incomes and unemployment rates.  The Illinois tax increase exacerbates both drivers 
of migration in complex ways:  on the one hand, a decrease in households’ disposable income 
reduces local demand and regional production, followed by declines in wages and employment.  
On the other hand, greater government expenditure from a tax increase stimulates regional 
production, and greater labor demand leads to growth in wages and employment.  Further 
complications arise when a higher corporate income tax leaves firms with less profit for 
                                                 
2Pew Center on the States.2009. Beyond California: States in Fiscal Peril (November 2009). 
3The Illinois report 2010, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois 
4Illinois State Budget, Fiscal Year 2010-2011, Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the Governor 
5Giertz, J. Fred. 2006. The Illinois State Budget and Pensions, in The State of the State of Illinois, Institute of 
Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois: 16-27. 
6Taxpayer Accountability and Budget Stabilization Act (P.A 96-1496), Center for Tax and Budget Accountability  
7Executive Summary, Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2011, State of Illinois Comptroller’s Office, page 23 and The Illinois 
State Comptroller’s Quarterly 2013 Q1, page 1, edition 7, published November 2012.  
8Migration data, Statistics of Income Division, Internal Revenue Service, USA 
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reinvestment and job-creation in Illinois, and when part of the state government’s expenditure is 
cash transfers to households and firms.  In order to comprehensively study the tax-increase’s total 
impact on the overall state economy especially labor migration, these different forces need to be 
evaluated.  Computational General Equilibrium (CGE) models are suitable for such studies, given 
their ability to model the mutual dependence of agents’ behaviors.  To the best of our knowledge, 
there has not yet been a CGE study of the diverse economic impacts of the Illinois 2011 tax, or an 
evaluation of the policy’s effectiveness in improving Illinois’s financial situation.   
This paper fills this gap and is the latest development of an existing CGE model, AMOIL 
(Turner et al., 2012), which originates from an earlier CGE model for Scotland, AMOS (Harrigan 
et al., 1991).   In addition, this paper adds to the empirical CGE literature by providing new 
evidence supporting concerns about the use of borrowed, rather than estimated, parameters in 
regional CGE models. 
Regional CGE models have a few limitations (Partridge and Rickman 1998,2010; Holland 
2010).   A major one is the utilization of borrowed parameters, instead of parameters estimated 
with regional data.   For example, the elasticities of substitution between domestic and imported 
goods have been estimated for the US economy (Stern et al., 1976; Shiells et al., 1986; Shiells and 
Reinert, 1993), but generally not for the states.  Therefore, regional CGE model simulations may 
not fit the reality well when they impose national parameters on regional analysis or make other 
assumptions about parameter values (see Partridge and Rickman, 1998, 2010).  
More recently, to address this limitation, CGE modelers have estimated parameters to 
improve model accuracy when data are available (e.g., Turner et al., 2012).  They have also 
conducted sensitivity analyses to explore how a model’s simulation results are robust to variance 
in key parameters (Hertel, 1985; Harrison and Vinod, 1992; Harrison et al., 1993; De Vuyst and 
Preckel, 1997; Jorgenson et al., 2013).  This paper follows this research line and, accordingly; 
parameters were estimated for the regional labor market.  To be more specific, the elasticity of 
regional real wage to unemployment rate, and two other elasticities related to labor migration were 
estimated. Sensitivity checks show that the estimated parameters outperform borrowed parameters 
in fitting simulation results to reality.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 introduces the Illinois CGE 
model, with especial attention to the way it models the regional labor market.  Section 3 discusses 
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the theoretical framework of labor migration and the wage curve.  Sections 4 and 5 present the 
econometric model and estimation results of migration-related parameters.  Section 6 uses the 
model to study the impacts of the 2011 Illinois tax increase and evaluates the tax increase’s 
effectiveness in quickly elevating the state’s financial standing.  Section 7 concludes the paper. 
1.2 The Illinois CGE model, AMOIL   
The Illinois CGE model developed in Turner et al. (2012), AMOIL, is used here to study the 
impacts of the 2011 tax increase.  AMOIL is an adaptation of the AMOS model (A Macro-micro 
Model for Scotland; see Harrigan et al., 1991 for an initial discussion of the model and Lecca, et 
al., 2013 for some recent updates) calibrated on a 2007 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 
Illinois, and it is suitable for studying small, open economies such as Illinois (4.3% of national 
GDP in 20149).   Turner et al. (2012) provide the most recent application of AMOIL.  The authors 
estimated Armington import-export substitution elasticities for the model, and their estimates are 
also used in this paper.  The structure of AMOIL is illustrated in figure 1, and an overview of the 
assumptions employed is presented in table 1.1.  
1.2.1 Intertemporal Dynamics  
CGE models are often myopic where agents make decisions solely based on current conditions.  
They could also be forward-looking when agents know both the current and future conditions, and 
how future conditions depend on current choices.  The forward-looking assumption is not used 
here due to its great computational complexity and the possibility of not finding an equilibrium.  
The current version of AMOIL performs long-term policy analysis, as presented in section 6, 
through recursive simulations.  Agents’ myopic choices change the state of the regional economy 
at the end of each period, and local labor and capital supplies change through migration and 
investment.  The new stocks of labor and capital enter the next period’s simulation as given.  
1.2.2 Production  
The production function of AMOIL is a nested combination of Leontief and Constant-Elasticity-
of-Substitution (CES) production functions (see figure 1.2a).  The first nest features a Leontief 
                                                 
9Regional/National GDP data, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce, USA 
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structure where total output has fixed ratio of intermediate inputs to value-added, while labor and 
capital are combined in the 2nd nest through a CES relationship to form value-added.  Intermediate 
inputs are purchased either from within the state or imported, depending on the price differentials 
between local and external markets.  Producers also serve local markets or export their products 
taking these price differentials into account. 
Faced with given demands in a period, producers optimize over domestic prices, external 
prices, capital and stocks, and the prevailing wage to find the optimal combinations of labor and 
capital.  In this process, capital and labor income are generated and distributed in fixed shares to 
domestic agents including households, firms, and the state government.  These agents are also 
recipients of exogenous remittances earned in the rest of the US (RUS) and the rest of the world 
(ROW).  
1.2.3 Consumption and Investment 
Households and Government spend earnings on consumption and investment (saving), while firms 
redirect part of profits into saving, too.  Consumption demands are met by either local suppliers or 
through imports, as is the case with intermediate input demands during the production process.  
All three agents, households, firms, and the state government allocate a fixed share of their income 
for investment (saving).  
Investment also comes from the RUS and ROW, besides Illinois agents’ savings.  Total 
investment in the region is a combination of all three kinds of savings through a nested CES 
structure.  ROW and a region-RUS composite are in the first nest, while the region and RUS are 
in the second nest.  The investment combination in each layer of the CES nest is the result of 
optimization over price differentials among Illinois, RUS, and ROW (see figure 1.2b).  The 
investment forms new capital and increases the capital stock available for production in future 
periods.  The total investment in each period is distributed to sectors through an accounting matrix. 
1.2.4 Labor and Migration 
AMOIL assumes a homogeneous labor market and labor supply increases/decreases solely through 
interregional migration.  The labor market is also assumed to have full labor participation meaning 
that no workers drop out of the labor force and all workers are up for hiring. Meanwhile, a 0.5% 
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annual growth rate in total factor productivity (TFP) is assumed.  In each period, equilibrium prices, 
total labor demand, real wages and the unemployment rates are solved simultaneously by the 
model.  As will be discussed in greater detail in section 3, labor migration is induced when there 
are wage and unemployment differentials between Illinois and RUS.  Contemporary labor supply 
and migration determine the labor stock available for next period’s production.  
1.3 Theories for labor migration and wage curve   
Harris and Todaro (1970) show that rural-to-urban labor migration is driven by higher expected 
wages in urban areas.  Applying their theoretical framework to analyze interregional migration, 
equation (1.1) presents a proposed formulation:  
𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = ℎ (
𝐸𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑌𝑟,𝑡
,
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑟,𝑡
) (1.1) 
At time 𝑡, the net migration rate in Illinois 𝑖 (𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖,𝑡) is a function of the differentials in expected 
income (𝐸𝑌𝑖 ) and amenity levels (𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ) between Illinois and the rest of the US (subscript 𝑟).  
Expected income is the product of real wage and employment rate:  
𝐸𝑌𝑘,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑘,𝑡 ∗
𝐸𝑘,𝑡
𝑁𝑘,𝑡
, 𝑘 = 𝑖, 𝑟     (1.2) 
where 𝑤𝑘,𝑡,  𝐸𝑘,𝑡, 𝑁𝑘,𝑡  are real wages, employment level, and the total labor force in  𝑘 at time 𝑡.  
Substituting (2) into (1) one obtains: 
𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = ℎ (
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑟,𝑡
∗
1 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡
1 − 𝑢𝑟,𝑡
,
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑟,𝑡
)      (1.3) 
where 𝑢𝑘,𝑡,  indicates the unemployment rate.  Following Layard et al. (1991) and Treyz et al. 
(1993) where the effect of unobserved amenity is captured by a constant term10, equation (1.3) has 
the following specification with an idiosyncratic error term 𝜖𝑖,𝑡:  
                                                 
10 This approach restricts amenity to time-invariant characteristics such as long-term climate of a region.  Admittedly, 
there are other definitions of amenity that encompass time-variant endowments that change in time.  However, it is 
difficult to acquire empirical metrics of the latter, and what exactly constitutes time-variant amenities is an ongoing 
research in the literature. In Treyz et al. 1993 and this paper, amenity is defined as characteristics that are fixed in 
time and enters the empirical model through regional fixed effects, while time-variant amenities are treated as 
idiosyncratic errors. 
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𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝜃 + 𝛼 ln (
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑟,𝑡
) + 𝛽 ln (
1 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡
1 − 𝑢𝑟,𝑡
) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (1.4) 
The intercept term 𝑙𝑛𝜃 captures the effect of long-term trend of migration out of Illinois, 
part of which is the effect of the long-term amenity differential between Illinois and the rest-of-
US on migration. The two drivers of interregional migration, real wages and unemployment, are 
related.  Blanchflower and Oswald (1994b, 2005) find a negative relationship between the real 
wage and the unemployment rate across different time and regions, which has come to be known 
as the wage curve.  This phenomenon might relate to the worker group bargaining power – the 
easier it is to replace a worker for a position, the higher the risk for a worker to be unemployed, 
and the lower is the prevailing wage.  
ln [
?̅?𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡
] = 𝜔 − 𝜀 ln(𝑢𝑖,𝑡)         (1.5) 
Equation (1.5) describes the interaction between the real wage and the unemployment rate 
in AMOIL.  The symbol ?̅?𝑖,𝑡  is the nominal wage, 𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡  is the consumer price index, 𝜔  is a 
parameter calibrated for the long term underlying trend, and 𝜀 is the elasticity of wage to the 
unemployment rate.  CGE modelers have used similar specifications to model the interaction 
between wages and unemployment in the labor market (see, for example, McGregor et al., 1996; 
Harrigan et al., 1991; Lecca et al., 2013).  However, usually the parameters are not estimated but 
borrowed from other regions or are educated guesses.  In this research, the wage-unemployment 
elasticity has been estimated with Illinois data and then used in model simulations of AMOIL.  
1.4 Estimation of Harris-Todaro Migration Model for Illinois  
The Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income Division (IRS-SOI) provides data on US 
domestic migration at the county/state level.  This paper utilizes county-level IRS data to analyze 
net-migration for Illinois during the period 2001-2013 to estimate the migration-relevant 
parameters in AMOIL.  The model specification is modified11 from Treyz et al. (1993):  
                                                 
11 The major difference is that Treyz et al. (1993) controlled for the industry-mix adjusted wage. The authors found 
no coefficient change after adjusting wages for industry-mix, implying that migrants are mobile across different 
industries.  Given these findings and the lack of employment-by-industry data at the county level, this paper does 
not adjust wage for local industry-mix.  
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𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃 + ∑ 𝛼𝑠𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑊𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚ln 𝑅𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=0
+ 𝑓𝑟 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝑆
𝑠=0
       (1.6) 
where 𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is the net migration rate of Illinois county 𝑖 in year 𝑡.  Net migration is the difference 
between the total inflow and outflow of migrants in a county, and the net migration rate is the ratio 
of that difference to the county’s labor force.  The symbol 𝑅𝑊𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 is the relative average real 
wage of the county to the US average in year 𝑡 − 𝑠;  𝑅𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−𝑚 is the relative unemployment rate 
in the county to the US average, with 𝑚 being the year lag;  𝑓𝑟 and 𝑔𝑡 are region and year fixed 
effects, and 𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑡 is an error term. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides county-level data 
on average wages, Consumer Price Index (CPI) as price deflator, and annual unemployment rates.  
Therefore, a panel covering 102 Illinois counties over 13 years is constructed for the analysis. 
Treyz et al. (1993) addressed three econometric issues related to equation (1.6). The first 
is simultaneity bias – not only will changes in the relative unemployment and wage rates motivate 
migration, but the reverse causality might also occur.  The authors performed both OLS and an 
Instrumental Variable approach and compare the results. A Hausman test accepts the null 
hypothesis that both approaches generate consistent estimates, thus the authors used the more 
efficient OLS estimates12.  The second issue is that migration may respond to contemporaneous 
variables as well as lagged covariates.  Using the Schwarz Standard (SC) and Akaike’s information 
criteria (AIC), the authors found that the optimal lag length was two years.  Thirdly, to account for 
different amenity levels of each state that might affect net migration, the authors included state 
fixed effects. The present paper follows their approach and includes state fixed effects as well as 
two lags of unemployment and wage in the model.  Table 1.2 summarizes the OLS regression 
results. The log of the contemporary unemployment rate has a coefficient of -0.033.  An 
insignificant contemporary wage-differential is consistent with agents’ risk-averse behaviour as 
noted in Treyz et al. (1993)13.   
                                                 
12 Admittedly, simultaneity bias may still exist because the reverse causality is theoretically justifiable in this case. 
The direction of bias for our estimates should be negative because both migration drivers, regional differentials in 
wage and unemployment rate, are expected to have negative correlation with the net out-migration rate in Illinois. 
13 Treyz et al. (1993) found migration within the US is mainly driven by employment prospects, as the coefficient of 
the wage differential is smaller than that of the unemployment differential.  This also implies that migrants are risk-
averse.  
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1.5 Estimation of the Illinois Wage Curve 
The Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA) data are used to construct a cross-
sectional dataset of 202,469 individual-level observations for Illinois during the period 2007-2011.  
Although other specifications for the wage-curve exist, this paper adopts the log-linear 
specification from Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a):  
ln(ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑡) = 𝛽 ln(𝑈𝑟𝑡) + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝑓𝑟 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑡       (1.7) 
where  ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑟𝑡 is the inflation adjusted real hourly wage of person i from region r in year t; 𝑈𝑟𝑡 is 
the annual unemployment rate of region r in year t;  𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 is a set of individual characteristics as 
control variables, including age, gender, educational attainment, weekly hours worked, marital 
status and the worker’s industry; 𝑓𝑟 and 𝑔𝑡 are region and time fixed effects respectively, and 𝑒𝑖𝑟𝑡 
is the error term.  The symbol 𝛽 represents the elasticity of wages to local unemployment rates.  
There are endogeneity issues with (7).  First, there is simultaneity bias because wage and 
unemployment rate are mutually dependent on each other.  Adopting the treatment proposed by 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a, 2005)14, the county unemployment rate has been instrumented 
with two lags of itself.  Secondly, there is an omitted variable bias because educational attainment 
and weekly worked hours are correlated with unobserved individual characteristics such as self-
discipline, which may also affect wages.  To address the omitted variable bias, the individual 
educational attainment and weekly work hours respectively were instrumented with countywide 
average educational attainment and county average weekly work hours.   
As for data, IPUMS-USA provides data for the individual-level covariates.  Individual 
hourly wage15 is constructed by dividing the person’s annual wage by weeks worked per year and 
hours worked per week.  Each Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) approximates a labor market, 
therefore the annual unemployment rates in Illinois MSAs are used for 𝑈𝑟𝑡 in equation (1.7).  Such 
                                                 
14In both papers of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a, 2005), the authors stated that using lagged unemployment rate 
as instruments was less than ideal, but there no data on exogenous regional labor demand variables.  Unfortunately, 
this is still a limitation of the current paper as an alternative instrument that could serve as a proxy for exogenous 
labor demand indicator has not been found.  
15 Card (1995) argued that one of the weakness of the original curve is that Blanchflower and Oswald had used annual 
wage estimates, instead of standardized hourly wage.  
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data are accessible from the database Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) in BLS.  In the 
estimation, year dummy variables and MSA dummy variables are also included.  
Table 1.3 compares the OLS and IV results.  Although a Hausman test does not reject the 
null hypothesis that the two specifications are similar, the IV estimates are used for two reasons.  
First, there are strong reasons to address the endogeneity issues, as discussed previously.  Secondly, 
the IV estimate of the unemployment-wage elasticity, 𝛽, is closer to the one found in Blanchflower 
and Oswald (2005).  The authors used the US state data and estimated the wage curve elasticities 
as approximately -0.1, while the current estimate for Illinois is -0.116.   
1.6 Policy Analysis of Illinois 2011 Tax Increase  
1.6.1 Accuracy Gains from Estimated Parameters and the Sensitivity Check   
To show the accuracy gains from using the estimated parameters, AMOIL is also estimated with 
the labor parameters estimated from US national data and the results are compared with those 
estimated using Illinois-based parameters.  Specifically, the wage-unemployment elasticity (𝛽 in 
equation 1.7), -0.1, was taken from Blanchflower and Oswald (2005); the migration-
unemployment elasticity (the sum of 𝛽𝑚 in equation 1.6), -0.18, was obtained from Treyz et al. 
(1993).  No value is borrowed for the migration-wage elasticity because it has an insignificant 
coefficient as estimated in sections 4 and 5.  
Comparison of the simulation results shows that those results using the econometrically 
estimated parameters provide a model with a closer fit to Illinois’s historical data, based on the 
sum of the squared difference between the simulated results and the observed data.  Since the focus 
of this study is the regional labor market, the observed data for real wages and the net labor 
migration rate has been compared with simulation results before/after the parameter estimation. 
Table 1.4 and figures 1.3 and 1.4 show that the simulation with estimated parameters provide a 
better fit.  The accuracy gains are 84.10% and 64.91% for the migration rate and real wages data, 
respectively.  Therefore, estimated labor market parameters have increased the accuracy of 
AMOIL.  
Noticeably, neither of the simulations presents an exact replication of historical data.   A 
few reasons might explain this limitation.  To begin with, the current version of AMOIL uses the 
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2007 Input-Output Table for Illinois and assumes that the exogenous world is fixed at the 2007 
situation.  Since the recession began in December 2007, AMOIL simulations in this paper have 
not incorporated changes in the macroeconomic environment.  A second reason is the absence of 
corporate migration in the model.  Higher corporate income tax rates are likely to drive firms to 
relocate some of their Illinois establishments or at least part of the set of goods and services 
produced or supplied in the state, but the current version of AMOIL has not addressed this 
possibility.  When firms relocate production, their employees might also relocate and pay taxes 
outside Illinois.  In that case, the model underestimates the negative impacts of the tax increase.  
A third factor relates to the borrowed parameters that are still being used in AMOIL.  Although 
this paper has estimated labor-market related parameters, the majority of AMOIL’s parameters are 
borrowed from AMOS (Harrigan et al., 1991).  
These features may have limited the model’s ability to replicate the reality, especially after 
2013 when the Illinois job market accelerated its recovery from the recession.  However, the model 
successfully captures the downward employment trend in Illinois during 2008-2013 showing a -
3.90% overall change.  In other words, the model approximated the actual -3.03%16 employment 
drop in Illinois from 2008 to 2013.    
The previous simulation used only point estimates of the parameters.  Table 1.5 reports a 
sensitivity check over possible ranges of the parameters.  The simulation results show that the 
accuracy gain is consistent for parameter variance as great as 50% of the original values.  As a 
general pattern, scaling down the parameters slightly improves the fit to empirical observations of 
the simulated migration rate and the real wage, and scaling up the parameters decreases the fit of 
both.  
1.6.2 Evaluating the Impacts of the Tax Increase  
Finally, a counterfactual simulation without the tax increase is performed to evaluate the impact 
of the tax increase on the Illinois economy.  In the counterfactual case, individual and corporate 
income tax rates are fixed at their pre-2011 levels, respectively 3% and 4.8%.   
                                                 
16Illinois total employment was 6,155,300 in 2008 and 5,968,300 in 2013. The 187,000-decrease was 3.03% to the 
2008 total employment. Data source: Wage & Salary Employment, Regional Data, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Department of Commerce, USA 
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Table 1.6 compares the simulation differences as percentages relative to the no-tax-
increase scenario.  For example, the 2015 total employment entry of -0.72% means total 
employment in that year is 99.28% of its counterfactual level without the tax increase.  This is 
equivalent to a loss of 44,400 jobs in 2015 (based on the Illinois 2015 total employment of 
6,126,300 jobs).   By way of comparison, the estimated job losses in the years of 2011-2014 are 
respectively 17,700, 27,400, 36,200 and 45,200.  These results are relatively consistent with, but 
lower in magnitude than Crosby and Merriman (2016)’s finding that the 2011 tax increase has on 
average reduced Illinois employment by 1.8 percent.  The difference might be traced to different 
approaches - Crosby and Merriman (2016) used an econometric approach holding other mid-west 
states as the control group, while this paper directly compares simulations with/out the tax increase.   
The paper also shows that the 2011 tax increase has raised the state government’s income 
but decreased the size of Illinois economy in the following years.  For example, in the year 2020, 
the tax increase will reduce GRP by 0.77%, total employment by 0.82%, household consumption 
by 0.74% and investment by 0.82% compared with the counterfactual scenario.  However, state 
government income is 1.61% higher and the overall state debt is 1.54% lower.17 Additionally, 
Illinois’s tax base of labor income, defined as the product of total employment and real wage, has 
shrunk.  The simulation shows that Illinois’s total employment and real wage in 2011 were 
respectively (1-0.30%)=99.70% and (1-0.45%)=99.55% of their would-be levels in the 
counterfactual scenario (see table 1.6).  Consequently, the tax base was only (1-0.30%)*(1-
0.45%)=99.25% of the would-be size.  Although the tax base rises slightly to 99.45% of the 
counterfactual level in 2020, it should be noticed that such minor recovery is driven by increases 
in the level of real wages while total employment continuously declined since the tax change.  
Therefore, the tax increase has induced out-migration that will irreversibly downsize Illinois’s tax 
base and generate greater negative impacts on the state’s economy.   
1.6.3 Scenarios on Different Government Expenditure Patterns 
At this point, all simulations assume that the state government maintains its 2007 expenditure 
pattern.  Specifically, the government spends 40.62% of its total annual income on purchases of 
                                                 
17The impacts of the tax increase are simulated under the assumption that state government maintains its expenditure 
pattern in the base year, 2007, throughout the simulation years.  Expenditure specifics are provided in section 6.3.  
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goods and services, 41.54% on transfers to households, 4.9% on debt payment and the remaining 
12.94% as fixed payment to the outside world (RUS and ROW).   However, since one of the 
purposes of the tax increase was to reduce Illinois’s accumulated debts, it is important to explore 
how the state could clear its long-term debts under different expenditure scenarios. 
Table 1.7 summarizes the clearance speeds of different debt-payment plans, as well as their 
impacts on the state’s economy.  The results show that the tax increase alone will not quickly 
reduce the accumulated debts, without the state simultaneously increasing the share of state income 
spent on debt payments.  Clearance could have been reached in 2013 if debt payment comprised 
30% of state income in every year after 2007, while fixing external transfers at 12.94% and 
dividing the remaining (100%-30%-12.94%)=57.06% equally between sectoral purchase and 
household transfers.  However, an early debt clearance generates a negative impact on the overall 
economic well-being.  The state government’s tighter budget and the reduction in household 
receipts of cash transfer directly lower the demands for regional goods and services.  Furthermore, 
there are indirect negative impacts on the economy through multiplier effects when producers 
reduce their output.  Therefore, expanding the income share for paying out long-term debts will 
enhance the negative impacts of the tax increase.  Table 1.7 illustrates this outcome this with two 
extreme scenarios.  If Illinois allocated 50% of its income for debt payment in every year after 
2007, it would have cleared all debts by 2011, leaving the income tax raise unnecessary.  However, 
this would generate a decline in the state’s 2020 GRP of -14%, reduced total employment by -
21%, real wages by -3%, and household consumption by -24% relative to the 2007 levels.  An 
allocation of 70% income on debt payment further expedites the clearance at even a greater cost 
to the future economy. In contrast, if the state puts only 10% of its annual income into debt 
payments, clearance of long-term debts will be postponed to after 2020 but with less negative 
impacts on the overall economy.   
Attention to the debt problem has become critical in the sense that the state’s bond rating 
is currently just above junk status,18 meaning that Illinois needs to pay a premium on interest rates.  
These funds could be directed to other uses that would more clearly benefit the state’s economy. 
The above analysis found that despite the urgency of debt clearance, raising the income taxes is 
                                                 
18 “Illinois Risks Rating Cut to Junk Even with Budget: Moody’s.” Reuters, July 6, 2017. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-illinois-budget/illinois-house-sets-thursday-budget-veto-override-vote-
idUSKBN19Q2P1. 
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not sufficient.  Policy makers will also need to expand the share of state income spent on debt 
payment, even at the cost of the state’s future economy.   
1.7 Conclusion  
This paper evaluates the impacts of Illinois’s 2011 tax increase under a fiscal decentralization 
scenario that is myopically focused on actions in Illinois alone.  The CGE model has enhanced 
explanatory power when the labor market parameters were estimated rather than borrowed from 
existing studies of other regions and historical periods.  Comparison of the simulations with/out 
the 2011 tax increase provides an approximation of its long-term negative impacts on Illinois 
regional economy in terms of GRP, labor out-migration, total employment, and real wage, 
although the state government’s income increased in the short term.  Moreover, this income gain 
is temporary because the tax increase has shrunk the size of Illinois’s tax base, resulting from the 
enhanced out-migration of taxpayers. In the long run, the state government’s tax revenue will 
decrease. In addition, the simulation results show that the tax increase alone will not quickly 
change Illinois’s financial standing, unless the state government allocates a significantly greater 
share of its revenue to debt repayment.  However, this additional allocation comes at a price of 
aggravating the negative economic impacts of the tax increase.   
The paper aims draw attention to the cautious policy maker of the tension between 
addressing the state’s fiscal responsibility (in hopes of retaining corporate activities as well as 
lowering the interest on bonds) through unilateral changes in tax rates versus reducing the short-
run negative impact on the economy that could be demonstrated following an increase in taxes. 
However, the current model has held the external financial market fixed, thus implicitly leaves out 
the economic impacts of an improved financial health of Illinois.   Timely debt payment and deficit 
clearance would lower the total interest payment and raise Illinois’s rating among financial 
institutes expanding the state’s access to external resources.  Moreover, the CGE model would 
benefit from a deeper integration with external financial market, as researchers and policy makers 
would be able to simulate and compare alternative bond-issuing strategies as a policy tool. 
Simulating these mechanisms requires modifying the CGE model for bond valuation, interest rate 
derivatives, and other fields in financial economics, topics for future research. 
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1.8 Figures  
 
Figure 1.1: Overview of the main Economic Flows in AMOIL
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Figure 1.2a: The Production Structure of AMOIL  
 
 
 
Figure 1.2b: The Investment Structure of AMOIL  
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Figure 1.3: Illinois Annual Net Migration Rate 2008-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Illinois Annual Real Wage relative to 2007 Level 2008-2015  
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1.9 Tables 
Table 1.1 Assumption Overview of AMOIL 
  
Variable Assumption 
Domestic Agents  Three groups: households, firms and government 
Sectors 25 in total (see Appendix 1)  
Final Demand Four components: Investment, Consumption, Intermediate Input, and export. 
Consumption is from government or household. Investment comes from all three 
domestic agents, while intermediate input is in fixed shares to output as in a Leontief 
production function. Export is determined by the price ratio between the domestic and 
the external market. 
External components Two external groups: The Rest of US (RUS) and the Rest of the World (ROW). The 
amounts of imported or exported goods are sensitive to the ratios between the domestic 
prices and the external prices. Since the current version of AMOIL is calibrated on a 
2007 Input-Output table for Illinois, the levels of cash transfer to Illinois from RUS and 
ROW are fixed at their 2007 levels in simulations.  
Production structure A nested structure featuring both Leontief and CES. Output takes fixed shares to 
intermediate inputs and value-added, while value-added is generated by labor and 
capital through a CES function. Intermediate input can be either bought domestically or 
be imported. Additionally, a 0.5% annual growth of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in 
production is assumed in the current version of AMOIL.  
Capital stock Direct investments have two purposes - the recovery of depreciated capital and the 
formation of new capital. Each period's investment changes the capital stock available 
for next period's production.  
Labor market  A single Illinois labor market with homogeneous labor supply and without sectoral 
wage differential. This means labor is mobile across sectors. Real wage is determined 
via a regional wage curve, reflecting the negative relationship between the 
unemployment rate and the real wage (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994b) 
Migration Migration is endogenously determined by the real wage differential and the 
unemployment rate differential between Illinois and RUS. Current period migration 
determines the labor supply of next period (Harris and Todaro, 1970).   
Intertemporal Elements Agents are myopic and make decisions according to contemporary conditions without 
taking the future into account.    
Trade & Government 
behavior 
Trade deficit/surplus is not required to be zero in the long run. Government income is 
endogenous but government expenditure has fixed shares in different categories.  
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Table 1.2: Regression results of Parameters Related to Illinois’s Labor Migration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 Summary Dependent Variable: 
VARIABLES Statistics Net Migration Rate 
Ln(WageDifferential) 
RWR 
-0.125 -0.0003 
 (0.079) (0.02) 
Ln(UmpDifferential) 
REO 
0.027 -0.033*** 
 (0.08) (0.009) 
   
MSA fixed Effect - Yes 
   
County fixed Effect - Yes 
   
Year Fixed Effect  - Yes 
Observations 1,326 1,020 
Adjusted R2 - 0.57 
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Table 1.3: Estimation Results of Illinois’s Wage Curve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Three variables might be endogenous, educational attainment, weekly work 
worked, and the log of county-wide unemployment rate. The IV approach instruments 
the three variables with the county-wide average educational attainment, county-wide 
average weekly work hours, and two lags of county unemployment rate. The test 
statistic of Sargan overidentification test is 0.239 corresponding to a p-value 0.6251. 
The underidentification test has a test statistic 6.656 corresponding to a p-value 0.04. 
Therefore, the instruments are valid and the model is correctly identified. The 
Hausman test comparing the IV approach and the OLS approach has a test statistic of 
6.13 with prob>chi-square being 1. However, the IV model is still used based on 
reasons given in the main text 
  
 Summary Models 
VARIABLES (sd) OLS IV 
lncump 0.496 -0.036*** -0.116** 
 (0.500) (0.018) (0.068) 
 age 41.60 0.07*** 0.093*** 
 (13.75) (0.0007) (0.04) 
 square of age - -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (8.47e-06) (0.0004) 
 marital status 0.563 0.106*** 0.162*** 
 (0.496) (0.004) (0.023) 
 Hispanic 0.130 -0.08*** -0.6*** 
 (0.336) (0.006) (0.23) 
 Asian 0.0568 -0.08*** 0.16 
 (0.231) (0.009) (0.099) 
 African American 0.114 -0.09*** -0.2*** 
 (0.318) (0.009) (0.07) 
 White 0.778 0.04*** 0.175*** 
 (0.415) (0.007) (0.057) 
 education 7.810 0.098*** -0.189 
 (2.341) (0.0008) (0.123) 
 Gender 38.90 -0.138*** -0.19** 
 (11.90) (0.004) (0.108) 
Weekly hours 38.87 0.003*** 0.004 
 (11.78) (0.0002) (0.026) 
Constant  - 0.22*** 1.733*** 
  (0.05) (0.785) 
F-statistics - 331.58 145.13 
Probability>F - 0 0 
Industry Fixed Effect - Yes Yes 
MSA fixed Effect - Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect  - Yes Yes 
Observations 135,137 135,137 135,137 
Adjusted R2 - 0.4108 - 
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Table 1.4: Accuracy Gain of AMOIL from the Parameter Estimation 
 Sum of Squared Difference 
 Migration Rate Real Wage 
Estimated 
Parameter 
0.0006 0.0013 
Borrowed  
Parameter 
0.0035 0.0036 
% of 
Improvement 
84.10% 64.91% 
 
 
 
Table 1.5: Sensitivity Check of AMOIL’s Accuracy Gain to Parameter Variance 
 Real Wage 
Migration 
Rate 
50% 55.91% 81.90% 
30% 41.62% 82.75% 
10% 61.34% 83.93% 
Original 64.91% 84.10% 
-10% 65.43% 84.35% 
-30% 68.23% 84.45% 
-50% 66.53% 84.54% 
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Table 1.6: The Impacts of the 2011 Illinois Tax Increase Relative to The Counterfactual Scenario 
 
 
Table 1.7: The Impacts of Different Government Expenditure Scenarios 
 
 
 
 
  
 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 
Gross Regional Product (GRP) 0.00% -0.19% -0.60% -0.70% -0.77% 
Total Employment 0.00% -0.30% -0.74% -0.76% -0.82% 
Real Wage 0.00% -0.45% -0.18% 0.23% 0.27% 
Households Consumption 0.00% -0.60% -0.95% -0.71% -0.74% 
Total Household Income tax 0.00% 7.63% 7.34% 2.46% 2.45% 
Business Tax (Total Production) 0.00% -0.17% -0.44% -0.45% -0.48% 
Government Income 0.00% 5.93% 5.63% 1.62% 1.61% 
Total Government Debt 0.00% -0.79% -1.04% -1.15% -1.54% 
Investment 0.00% -0.79% -1.26% -0.82% -0.82% 
Capital Stock 0.00% 0.00% -0.38% -0.60% -0.69% 
  2020 level relative to 2007  
% of Government 
Income on Debt 
Payment 
Debt 
Clearance 
Year 
GRP 
Total 
Employment  
Real Wage 
Hhold 
Consumption 
Old Pattern (4.9%) >2020 1.00 0.94 1.03 0.98 
10% >2020 0.99 0.93 1.02 0.97 
30% 2013 0.94 0.88 1.00 0.89 
50% 2011 0.90 0.83 0.98 0.82 
70% 2010 0.86 0.79 0.97 0.76 
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CHAPTER 2: NONLINEAR TAX-INDUCED MIGRATION: AN 
OVERLOOKED TALE 19 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: The empirical literature on tax-induced migration (TIM) primarily focused on 
estimating the average elasticity of migration to interregional tax differentials but ignores the 
potential effect of the variations around this average. This paper extends the work of Moretti and 
Wilson (2017) and finds salient nonlinearity in the TIM of star scientists between 1977 and 2010.  
The results suggest that differences in personal income tax (ATR) and research and development 
(R & D) tax credits between two states generate nonlinear impacts on migration; there is evidence 
of an important inertia range in which the differences generate little impact on migration. In 
contrast, the corporate income tax (CIT) has approximately linear effects and investment tax credit 
(ITC) has consistent effects only when the destination state initially has higher credits than the 
origin state.  As different taxes or tax credits have distinctive nonlinear effects on migration, 
decision makers are cautioned of using average elasticities of TIM in policy making. 
 
Keywords: Regional tax policies; skill migration; semiparametric method 
JEL Classification: C14, H71, O1 
 
 
2.1  Introduction  
Tax policies are an important tool in the regional competition for skilled migrants.  In the US, 
many states openly compete for business activities and high-skill workers by offering lower taxes.  
For example, in 2013 The New York Times (Stewart, 2013) and Forbes (Gregory, 2013) published 
articles that debated whether millionaire taxpayers had fled from states with high income taxes.   
The existing literature on tax-induced migration (TIM) has mainly focused on the 
estimation of the average elasticity of migration to taxes but has largely ignored the variance 
around these estimates.  For example, if TIM has a threshold pattern where migrants respond only 
to tax differentials outside an “inertia range,” then small-scale fiscal adjustments might not attain 
                                                 
19This chapter is reprinted with permission from Zhang, Y., & Hewings, G. J. D. (2019). Nonlinear Tax-Induced 
Migration: An Overlooked Tale. The Annals of Regional Science. Copyright 2019 by Springer 
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the policy goal of skill attraction.   
This paper aims to fill this literature gap by investigating nonlinear effects of taxes on 
migration.  Specifically, it applied a spline regression to the dataset of Moretti and Wilson (2017) 
and observe different nonlinear patterns in the effects of four types of taxes on scientist migration. 
The paper then used bin regression to confirm the statistical significance of observed marginal 
effect variations. The results suggest that personal income tax and research and development tax 
credit have threshold patterns in their effects on inter-state migration and migration only occurred 
once certain thresholds in tax/credit gaps are met. The inter-state gap of net-of-ATR and R& D tax 
credit need to be respectively greater than or equal to 4 and 10 percentage points to induce 
migration. In contrast, corporate income tax has a linear effect on migration: a one-percent increase 
in tax differentials between two states leads to a fixed percentage increase in the migration flows 
between the two states, as described by an average elasticity. Meanwhile, investment tax credits 
have a stable effect on migration only when the destination state initially has higher credits than 
the origin state.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the empirical tax-
induced migration literature, while section three presents the theoretical frameworks of tax-
induced migration using spline regression. Section four discusses the data, and section five 
presents the empirical findings. Section six concludes the paper. 
2.2 Literature Review and Motivation 
 
Researchers have found empirical evidence for tax-induced labor migration. For example, for US 
domestic migration Bakija and Slemrod (2004) found that state personal income taxes had 
significant impacts on the total number of the federal estate tax returns in each state.  Cohen et al. 
(2011) identified a small but significant effect of the marginal tax rate on the net out-migration of 
income and people.  Akcigit et al. (2016) studied superstar inventors’ migration and estimated the 
elasticity of domestic inventors’ migration to the net-of-income-tax rate as around 0.03, while that 
of foreign inventors as around one.  Regarding international tax-induced labor migration, Kleven 
et al. (2013) analyzed the labor market for professional football players across 14 European Union 
countries and estimated their elasticity of tax-induced migration at around 0.15. Kleven et al. 
(2014) showed that a Danish tax reform that lowered income taxes had doubled the number of 
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highly paid foreigners in Denmark relative to less well-paid foreigners. An important recent 
development of the tax-induced migration literature is the work of Moretti and Wilson 2017.  The 
authors separated supply-side migration from demand-driven migration.  The former is individual 
migration that would be motivated by personal income taxes or tax credits, while the latter occurs 
when a corporation relocate its employees to low-tax or high-credit states.  The authors estimated 
the elasticities of star scientists’20  migration to personal net-of-income-tax, corporate net-of-
income-tax, and corporate investment tax credit respectively as 1.8, 1.9, and 1.7.  Research and 
Development tax credits were not significant.  
The TIM literature to date has focused on estimating the average elasticities without 
considering the variation of marginal effects, implicitly assuming a linear effect. However, the 
marginal probability of migration might not be homogeneous under different levels of tax 
differences. For example, due to the individual taxpayer’s incomplete information of how tax rates 
differ across states, an “inertia range” might exits where small inter-state tax differences have no 
significant impact on people’s migration choice. A few exceptions in the TIM literature 
investigated nonlinear tax-induced migration. Coomes and Hoyt (2008) found that migration 
between MSAs was most responsive to tax differences above a threshold level of 1.5 percentage 
points and between areas that did not have reciprocity agreements.21 However, it was not clear 
why they chose the 1.5 percent threshold, nor was there any discussion of the marginal effects 
above 1.5 percent.  Hsing (1995) and Hsing and Mixon (1996) built on the work of Cebula (1990) 
and identified a quadratic relationship between tax and migration. However, the papers did not 
fully develop theoretical frameworks for labor migration, especially the log-odds ratio model that 
relates migration to the utility gains of different migration destinations.  Moreover, no specific 
reason was provided to adopt a quadratic model as opposed to other models.  In the broader labor 
migration literature, Basile and Lim (2017) found a threshold pattern in the effect of regional wage 
differentials on migration.  However, the authors did not quantify how migration flows change 
marginally at the threshold values.  
The present paper develops the research of nonlinear TIM in two ways. First, it 
                                                 
20 Star scientists are defined as exceptional inventors that, in a given year, are at or above the 95th percentile in number 
of patents over the past ten years (Moretti and Wilson 2017). 
21 Employees who live in one state but work in another only need to pay state and local taxes of his/her home state if 
the two states have tax reciprocity agreement.  
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investigates and compares the nonlinear effects of different demand- and supply-side taxes on labor 
migration; the findings of Basile and Lim (2017) justify an expectation of a threshold effect of 
individual income taxes, but corporate income taxes may still have linear effects because 
corporates usually have better knowledge of interregional tax differences, less liquidity constraints, 
and are more risk-neutral.  Secondly, it did not use an ad hoc manner to choose a nonlinear model 
or to identify the critical points of interests because spline regression traces the marginal effects of 
taxes.  The nonlinearity of marginal effects is further quantified with statistical significance in bin 
regression.   
2.3 Empirical migration studies and smoothing spline  
This section lays out the theoretical framework of labor migration and spline regression.  A logistic 
model and its variants have been widely used in the place-to-place labor migration literature 
(Gabriel et al.1987; Gabriel et al. 1992,1993; Gabriel et al. 1995; Sasser 2010; Kleven et al. 2013; 
Cohen et al. 2011).  The underlying assumption is that individuals make pairwise comparisons 
between alternative origin-destination pairs and choose the pair that yields the highest expected 
utility gain from migration.  The logistic migration models allow for flexible specifications to 
investigate and compare the effects of different migration drivers.22  Moretti and Wilson (2017) 
modified the model to incorporate the impacts of income taxes or tax credits on corporate 
migration.  Corporations have incentives to redistribute their workforce to low-tax states, and such 
demand-driven migration should be differentiated from supply-driven migration that might be 
motivated by differences in state personal income taxes.  Equating demand- and supply-driven 
migration results in an equilibrium migration: the likelihood that an individual moved from region 
𝑖 to 𝑗 at time 𝑡, relative to the probability of staying in that state, known as the “log-odds ratio,” 
has a linear form:  
 
log (
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡
) = ∑ 𝛼𝑘 [log (
1 − 𝜋𝑘𝑗𝑡
1 − 𝜋𝑘𝑖𝑡
)]
𝑘∈𝑇𝑎𝑥
+ ∑ 𝛽ℎ [log (
𝜏ℎ𝑗𝑡
𝜏ℎ𝑖𝑡
)]
ℎ∈𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑
+ γ𝑖 + γ𝑗 + γ𝑖𝑗 + γ𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2.1) 
 
                                                 
22 For example, Sasser (2010) modified the logistics model to investigate the relative importance of three migration 
drivers - labor market conditions, per capita incomes, and housing affordability over time. The logistic model in 
Gabriel et al. (1993) allows for testing a hypothesis of asymmetric information flow between the origin and destination 
states.  
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where log (
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡
) is the equilibrium log-odds ratio incorporating both demand- and supply-driven 
migration; indices 𝑖 and 𝑗 respectively indicate the origin and destination states; 𝑘 indexes two 
types of income taxes, average personal income tax (𝐴𝑇𝑅) and corporate income tax (𝐶𝐼𝑇), while 
ℎ  indexes investment tax credit (𝐼𝑇𝐶 ) and R and D credits (𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑 ).  Therefore, 𝜋𝑘𝑗𝑡  is the 
destination state’s personal/corporate income tax rate at time 𝑡 , 1 − 𝜋𝑘𝑗𝑡 is the average net-of-
income-taxes, and 𝜏ℎ𝑗𝑡 is the destination state’s tax credits at time 𝑡 .  The net-of-income-tax 
differentials and tax-credit differentials between the origin and destination states are respectively 
represented by log (
1−𝜋𝑘𝑗𝑡
1−𝜋𝑘𝑖𝑡
) and [log (
𝜏ℎ𝑗𝑡
𝜏ℎ𝑖𝑡
)].  Since higher net-of-income-tax and tax credits in the 
destination state increases migration, the coefficients 𝛼𝑘 and 𝛽ℎ are expected to have positive signs.  
γ𝑖, γ𝑗 respectively capture the time-invariant production and consumption amenities in the states 
of origin and destination; γ𝑖𝑗 indicates any time-invariant interregional differences such as climate, 
regional industrial compositions, or long-term housing price differentials; γ𝑡 captures the effects 
of nation-wide common shocks to all states in a specific year, such as rule changes in federal tax 
deductibility; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑗𝑡 captures the effect of time-variant regional differences on migration.   
The key identification assumption of equation (2.1) is that the differences in migration 
flows between two states, or a state-pair, is permanent after controlling for state-pair fixed effect 
 γ𝑖𝑗, year fixed effects γ𝑡, and region*year fixed effects γ𝑖𝑗𝑡 (e.g. regional business cycles).  In this 
way, the effect of changes in state tax-differentials on the changes in migration flows has a causal 
interpretation.  Moretti and Wilson (2017) further address potential omitted-variable bias; first, 
they showed that the fortunes of local patent-holding companies are not systematically associated 
with tax changes, therefore state governments did not alter tax policies to help underperforming 
local businesses, or to collect more taxes from well-performing local businesses.  Secondly, the 
estimated impulse functions illustrated a causal relation in the time difference between the 
incidences of tax changes and scientist migration.  The authors also ruled out the possibility of 
non-random selection.  This may emerge if the origin*destination*year cells with zero mobility, 
which are left out of the regression, are systematically associated with tax-changes.  
To investigate the variation in the marginal effects of interstate tax differences on scientist 
migration, equation (2.1) is augmented with smoothing spline terms for each of the four types of 
taxes.  Smoothing splines are related to regression splines which first divide the range of 
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independent variable 𝑥 into 𝐾 distinct regions.  Within each region, a polynomial function is fit to 
the data.  However, these polynomials are constrained to join smoothly at the region boundaries, 
or knots.  Provided that the interval is divided into enough regions, the method can produce a 
highly flexible fit to the data.  A smoothing spline is similar to a regression spline but results from 
minimizing a residual sum of squares (RSS) criterion augmented with a smoothness penalty as 
shown in (2): 
 
∑(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑔(𝑥𝑖))
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜆 ∫ 𝑔′′(𝑡)2𝑑𝑡 
(2.2) 
 
In equation (2.2), 𝜆 is a nonnegative parameter and the function 𝑔 that minimizes (2) is known as 
the smoothing spline with some special properties (James et al. (2013)); it is a piecewise cubic 
polynomial with knots at the unique values of 𝑥1, 𝑥2 … 𝑥𝑛, and has continuous first and second 
derivatives at each knot.  Furthermore, outside of the extreme knots, 𝑔 is linear.  
 The parameter 𝜆 determines the smoothness of fit.  When 𝜆 = 0, there is no penalty of 
overfitting and RSS can be made zero by choosing a value of 𝑔 that perfectly interpolates all 
observations.  When 𝜆 = ∞, the optimal choice of 𝑔 would be a linear function with 𝑔′′ = 0.  The 
slope of the linear function could be estimated by an OLS regression.  The optimal of 𝜆 is chosen 
by leave-one-out-cross-validation (LOOCV) as discussed in James et al. (2013)). 
The Generalized Additive Model (GAMs) provide a general framework for extending a 
standard linear model by allowing non-linear functions such as smoothing spline for each of the 
variables separately while holding all the other variables fixed.  The econometric form is: 
 
log (
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡
) = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝑠 [log (
1 − 𝜋𝑘𝑗𝑡
1 − 𝜋𝑘𝑖𝑡
)]
𝑘∈𝑇𝑎𝑥
+ ∑ 𝑠 [log (
𝜏ℎ𝑗𝑡
𝜏ℎ𝑖𝑡
)]
ℎ∈𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑
+ γ𝑡 + γ𝑖𝑗 + γ𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝑢 𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2.3) 
 
where 𝑠( ) is the spline term for each of the taxes or tax-credits; γ𝑡 is year fixed effect, γ𝑖𝑗 is the 
fixed effect for each asymmetric state-pair; γ𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a fixed effect for each of origin-
region*destination-region*year combination.  
The results of the spline regression (2) are comparable to those of Moretti and Wilson 
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(2017) because the only difference with the latter’s baseline specification23 is the replacement of 
linear tax (net-of-tax) terms with the spline terms.  Since the replacement does not alter the causal 
inference arguments, the estimated smoothing splines also have the interpretation as long-run, 
causal effects of taxes on migration.  Although it is not feasible to derive all marginal slope changes 
at all observations 𝑥1, 𝑥2 … 𝑥𝑛 , it is possible to plot the fitted values of smoothing spline and 
observe if any nonlinear patterns.   
2.4 Data  
Scientists are economically important and associated with the fostering of new industries and job 
creation (Zucker et al. 1998; Zucker and Darby 2006), and their interregional mobility motivates 
the policy and research discussions of ‘brain drain.’  Moretti and Wilson (2017) derived the 
longitudinal address information of star scientists, with patent counts in the top 5% of the 
distribution, from the COMETS patent database (Zucker et al. 2011) to compute star scientists’ 
bilateral migration flows for every pair of states (51x51) between 1977 and 2010.  The authors 
then joined bilateral outmigration to the origin-destination states’ differential in personal and 
business taxes or tax credits.  The probability of a scientist moving from one state to another 
relative to the probability of staying at the origin state is the outmigration odds-ratio, as discussed 
in section three.  Potentially, there were 84,150 origin*destination*year cells but only 15,247 of 
them have positive migration flows.  
The data contains information on four types of taxes or tax credits. Individual income 
average tax rate (ATR) is the average tax burden of a potential star scientist in a state.  Since the 
COMET dataset did not provide income information, star scientists have been assumed to be 
among top 1% income earners in the US.  In some states, federal income taxes can be deducted 
from state income taxes but in other states they cannot.  To account for such interaction between 
federal taxes and state income taxes, the authors used total ATR instead of mere statutory state 
income taxes.  Corporate income tax rates (CIT) in each state were the effective rates that were 
also adjusted for the deductibility of state taxes on federal corporate tax returns or vice versa 
(Chirinko and Wilson 2008).  Investment tax credit (ITC) is a credit against corporate income tax 
                                                 
23 Specification (6) of table 2a) in Moretti and Wilson (2017) has provided the baseline regression results. It was the 
preferred specification among a variety of models controlling for state fixed effects, state-year fixed effects (state-
specific time trends) or region-year fixed effects (region-specific time trends). 
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that encourages companies to locate more of its properties and payroll in a state; therefore, it is 
assumed that these credits will impact the demand-side migration of scientists when the company 
relocates its staff to a state offering higher investment credits.  In contrast, Research and 
Development tax credits can be offered to both individuals (against individual income taxes) and 
corporations (against corporate income taxes); in this case, the impacts will be on both demand- 
and supply-side migration. 
Figure 2.1 shows four bin-scatterplots of the log odds-ratio against the log net-of-tax rates 
controlling for state-pair and year fixed effects, in the same fashion as figure 1.4 in Moretti and 
Wilson (2017) but with more bins.24  To show the trend, B-splines with 3 degrees of freedom are 
also plotted between the outmigration log-odds ratio and each of the tax or tax credits.  The top 
left panel shows that in close proximities of the y-axis, the outmigration between a given origin-
destination pair does not vary significantly to the changes in the net-of-ATR rate in the origin state 
but the effect increases when the net-of-tax diverges from zero. The top right panel, in contrast, 
shows a linear relationship between CIT and outmigration except at outer ranges of net-of-CIT 
differentials, but the confidence intervals at outer variable values are too wide for a meaningful 
interpretation.  The bottom left panel has an asymmetric pattern across the y-axis: an upward trend 
emerges under positive initial destination-origin credit differentials, but outmigration does not 
seem to vary under negative credit differentials. The last panel also shows such asymmetric pattern 
across the y-axis between outmigration and R & D research credits.  Altogether, figure 2.1 provides 
preliminary evidence25 of different relationships between outmigration and net-of-taxes or tax 
credits, motivating a deeper investigation of potential effect variations.  
2.5 Empirical Results 
Table 2.1 summarizes the result of fitting the spline augmented GAM in equation (2.3).  Each of 
the four p-values corresponds to a null hypothesis of a linear relationship versus the alternative of 
                                                 
24 Figure 4 in Moretti and Wilson (2017) show a series of bin-scatterplots of the log odds-ratio against the log net-of-
tax rate after demeaning the log odds-ratio and the log net-of-tax rates by their within-pair and within-year sample 
means. They used 40 bins sorted along the x-axis, and this paper uses 80 bins.  
25 The B-splines only illustrate the one-to-one partial relationship between outmigration and each tax, leaving the 
effects of other taxes out of consideration. Additionally, the choice of B-spline with three degrees of freedom is ad 
hoc. In contrast, generalized additive model (GAM) with smoothing spline terms does not require manual choices 
of degrees of freedom and simultaneously incorporates all taxes.   
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a non-linear relationship (James et al. (2013)).  The significance levels provide clear evidence that 
all four taxes or tax credits have nonlinear effects on scientist migration.  
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the fitted smooth functions alongside their confidence intervals 
for the four taxes and compare them with the elasticities estimated in Moretti and Wilson 2017.  
The vertical axis reports the scale of the expected values of the log-odds ratio; the horizontal axis 
reports the scale of the log of interregional tax differentials.  The red dotted lines display the 
average elasticities estimated in Moretti and Wilson (2017).  The wide confidence intervals at the 
outer range of tax differentials is typical of spline regression (James et al. (2013)).  The upper 
panel of figure 2.2 displays a clear threshold pattern:  the slope of the fitted value curve, and thus 
the marginal effect of net-of-tax differentials, increases more rapidly after a 4 percent differential 
is reached.  On the other hand, the lower panel of figure 2.2 shows a mainly linear effect on 
migration throughout most of the range of CIT.  The upper panel of figure 2.3 shows that ITC has 
a linear effect when there is higher tax credit in the destination state than in the origin state, but 
the effects vacillate between positive and negative values without clear interpretation when the 
origin state initially had higher tax credits; the lower panel of figure 2.3 shows that the R and D 
tax credit also has a threshold pattern like net-of-ATR but with greater thresholds: credit 
differentials impact migration only when they exceed 10 percent. 
 Figures 2.2 and 2.3 present the general nonlinearity patterns of the taxes but do not quantify 
marginal effect changes.  Table 2.2 uses bin regression on the full sample to fill this gap.  Column 
(1) replicates the baseline results reported in table 2a column six of Moretti and Wilson (2017), 
while column (2) augments the baseline specification with interaction terms corresponding to 
nonlinear effects 26.   
The interpretations of figures 2.2, 2.3, and table 2.2 are compatible with those of the linear 
average elasticities, but the latter glosses over important effect variations.  For ATR, a 4 percent 
net-of-tax differential would not induce changes in migration flows. However, when the ATR net-
of-tax is 4 percent or higher in 𝑗 than in 𝑖, an additional 1% increase in after-tax income in 𝑗 is 
associated with a 1.84 percent increase in the net flow of star scientist moving from 𝑖 to 𝑗.  On the 
                                                 
26 The smoothing splines display changes of marginal effects at ±0.04 for ATR, zero for ITC, ±0.1 for R and D 
credits, and no change for CIT.  Therefore, for the bin regression, ATR is interacted with the indicator functions 
1(𝐴𝑇𝑅 ≥ 0.04) and 1(𝐴𝑇𝑅 ≤ −0.04), as well as CIT/ITC with 1(𝐶𝐼𝑇/𝐼𝑇𝐶 ≥ 0). ITC is further interacted with 
1(𝐼𝑇𝐶 ≤ −0.02). R and D credit is interacted with 1(𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑) ≥ 0.1 and 1(𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑 ≤ −0.1).  
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other hand, when the net-of-tax is four percent lower in 𝑗 than in 𝑖, an additional 1% in after-tax 
income in 𝑗 would induce a 1.57 percent migration flow from 𝑖 to 𝑗.  The effect of CIT does not 
have an inertia range and an additional 1% increase in net-of-tax in 𝑗 would linearly induce a 1.55 
percent migration-flow increase from 𝑖 to 𝑗, regardless of the sign and magnitude of the original 
net-of-tax differential of 𝑗 relative to 𝑖.  
The nonlinearity of ITC has an asymmetric pattern: if the net-of-tax is originally higher 
in 𝑗, then a 1% increase in 𝑗’s credit would result in a 2.77 percent increase in the migration flow 
from 𝑖 to 𝑗.  The effect is linear without an inertia range, meaning that the 2.77-percent migration 
increase occurs regardless of the magnitude of the initial 𝑗 to 𝑖 net-of-tax differential.  However, if 
𝑗 originally has lower credit than 𝑖 and the 1% credit-increase only narrows the gap, then the 
migration flow from 𝑖 to 𝑗 may either increase or decrease due to the credit increase in 𝑗, depending 
on whether the initial credit difference exceeds -0.02.  R & D research credit has a similar threshold 
pattern as ATR: the inertia range is between -0.1 and 0.1 and the migration responses are 
respectively 1.82 percent and 0.97 percent respectively when state 𝑗 originally had higher or lower 
credits.  
2.6 Conclusion 
The average elasticities of labor migration to interregional tax differences estimated in the previous 
literature have potentially important variance effects.  This paper extends Moretti and Wilson 
(2017) and finds different nonlinear effects for four types of taxes or tax credits on migration.  The 
effects of personal income taxes and research and development tax credit have threshold patterns, 
meaning that the migration flows of scientists only respond to net-of-tax or credit differentials that 
are outside the “inertia ranges.” The inter-state differentials of net-of-ATR and R& D tax credit 
need to be respectively greater than or equal to four and ten percentage points to induce migration. 
Corporate income taxes have an overall linear effect; migration flows have a stable response to 
CIT changes and raising the net-of-tax in the destination state attracts migrants from other states 
regardless of the initial net-of-taxes differentials. Corporate investment credits have consistently 
positive effects on migration only when the destination state initially had higher tax credits than 
the origin state.  In other words, raising tax credits in the destination state would not consistently 
attract migrants from other states that have a higher level of tax credits.  Meanwhile, it is important 
to stress again that the data did not provide patent holders’ income but their combined salary and 
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capital gains income were assumed to be in the top 1% in the nation. Therefore, it is not feasible 
to investigate how differences in income might lead to different responses for a given difference 
in tax rates.  For future studies without this data limitation, the investigation of the combination of 
nonlinearities in both income and tax differences might provide new findings on migration 
behaviors. 
Contemporary regional competition often features fiscal strategies to attract highly-
skilled workers and business activities that are critical to local technological innovation and 
economic growth.  Therefore, it is vital to understand how fiscal tools truly impact migration.  As 
taxes have nonlinear impacts on migration, decision makers need to be cautious about the use of 
the average TIM elasticities estimated in the previous literature in policy making.  As with other 
forms of migration, this paper has revealed some important inertia ranges in tax differentials.  
Hence, a state attempting to adjust tax rates needs to consider not just the opportunity cost of lost 
revenue (due to the downward adjustment of tax rates) but the probability that the anticipated in-
migration of skilled workers/businesses will occur.  
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2.7 Figures  
Figure 2.1: Bin-scatter Plots of Outmigration to Taxes 
  
 
 
 
Note: Figure 1 shows four bin-scatterplots of the log odds-ratio against the log net-of-tax rates controlling for state-pair and year 
fixed effects, in the same fashion as figure 4 in Moretti and Wilson (2017) but with more bins. To show the trend, B-splines with 3 
degrees of freedom are also plotted between the outmigration log-odds ratio and each of the tax or tax credits. The top left panel 
shows that in close proximities of the y-axis, the outmigration between a given origin-destination pair does not vary significantly 
to the changes in the net-of-ATR rate in the origin state but the effect increases when the net-of-tax diverges from zero. The top 
right panel shows a linear relationship between CIT and outmigration except at outer ranges of net-of-CIT differentials, but the 
confidence intervals at outer variable values are too wide for a meaningful interpretation. The bottom left panel has an asymmetric 
pattern across the y-axis: an upward trend emerges under positive initial destination-origin credit differentials, but outmigration 
does not seem to vary under negative credit differentials. The last panel also shows such asymmetric pattern across the y-axis 
between outmigration and R and D research credits.  
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Figure 2.2: Smoothing Splines of Personal and Corporate Income Taxes 
 
 
Note: The vertical axis reports the scale of the expected values of the log-odds ratio; the 
horizontal axis reports the scale of the log of interregional tax differentials. The red dotted 
lines display the average elasticities estimated in Moretti and Wilson (2017). The blue solid 
tick marks are indicators of one and two standard deviations of the tax differences from 
zero. The wide confidence intervals at the outer range of tax differentials is typical of spline 
regression (James et al. (2013)). The upper panel displays a clear threshold pattern:  the 
slope of the fitted value curve increases more rapidly after a 4 percent differentials is 
reached. The lower panel shows a mainly linear effect on migration throughout most of 
the range of CIT  
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Figure 2.3: Smoothing Splines of Corporate Investment, R and D Tax Credits 
 
 
Note: The vertical axis reports the scale of the expected values of the log-odds ratio; the 
horizontal axis reports the scale of the log of interregional tax differentials. The red dotted 
lines display the average elasticities estimated in Moretti and Wilson (2017). The blue solid 
tick marks are indicators of one and two standard deviations of the tax differences from zero. 
The upper panel shows that ITC has a stable linear effect only when initially there is higher 
tax credit in the destination state than in the origin state; the lower panel of figure 3 shows 
that the R and D tax credit also has a threshold pattern like net-of-ATR but with greater 
thresholds: credit differential impacts migration only when it exceeds 10 percent. 
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2.8 Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Spline Regression Results 
 edf Ref.df F p-value 
s(ATR) 7.556 8.531 6.83 2.02e-09 *** 
s(CIT) 8.265 8.871 6.839 7.82e-10 *** 
s(ITC) 8.332 8.877 13.732 < 2e-16 *** 
s(R and D cred) 8.765 8.981 9.697 4.73e-14 *** 
n = 15226,  R-sq.(adj) = 0.825 , Deviance explained = 85%  
Note: the first two columns are the values of equivalent degrees of freedom, or the most suitable degrees 
of polynomials to approximate the spline term. The third column is the F-statistics, and the fourth column 
is the p-values associated with a linear null hypothesis.  
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Table 2.2: Interaction Augmented Full Sample 
Regression 
 (1) (2) 
ATR, 99th Perc. (1 - atr) 1.93*** 0.10 
ATR * 𝟏(ATR ≥ 0.04) - 1.84*** 
ATR* 𝟏(ATR ≤ −0.04) - 1.57*** 
State CIT (1 - cit) 1.89*** 1.55*** 
CIT *  𝟏(ITC ≥ 0) - 0.17 
State ITC (1 + itc) 1.80*** -9.89*** 
ITC *  𝟏(ITC ≥ 0) - 12.66*** 
ITC *  𝟏(ITC ≤ −0.02) - 10.79*** 
R and D Credit (1 + cred) 0.4** -0.21 
Cred *  𝟏(Cred ≥ 0.1) - 1.82*** 
Cred *  𝟏(Cred ≤ −0.1) - 0.97*** 
Origin*Destination Pair FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Origin and Destination Pair 
Region*Year FE 
Yes Yes 
Note: Each column is from a separate regression. Column (1) is the 
baseline results of Moretti and Wilson (2017). Standard errors are 
corrected with three-way clustering by origin-state*year, destination-
state*year, and state-pair.  All regressions include year fixed effects, 
and have 15226 observations.  * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01 
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CHAPTER 3: THE OWNER-RENTER INCIDENCE GAP OF GENTRIFICATION 
- A PERSPECTIVE FROM DOWNWARD MOBILITY 
 
 
 
Abstract: The gentrification-displacement literature generally does not find higher 
mobility rates in gentrifying than in nongentrifying neighborhoods. However, recent literature has 
discerned that households that did move out from gentrifying neighborhoods face a higher risk to 
move to a more disadvantaged neighborhood than their counterparts from nongentrifying 
neighborhoods. This paper develops this research line by further investigating how downward 
mobility is impacted by not only gentrification but also housing tenure status. With more 
vulnerable housing status, renter migrants are expected to have a greater incidence of downward 
movement than homeowners, and this is confirmed by the empirical results of the analysis. Renters 
on average have a 12.2 percentage-point higher probability than homeowners to move to a more 
disadvantaged destination, regardless of the gentrification intensity in the origin neighborhood. On 
the other hand, intensely gentrified neighborhoods observe a 5.4 percentage point higher 
downward mobility than nongentrified neighborhoods, for renters and owners alike. Although the 
synergy of housing tenure and gentrification can make a difference in downward movement 
probability as high as 17.6 percentage points, their interaction terms tend to be insignificant 
meaning that the magnitude of the owner-renter incidence gap does not vary across gentrifying 
and nongentrifying neighborhoods.    
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The socioeconomic upgrading of gentrifying neighborhoods has been thought to be associated with 
the displacement of its long-term, incumbent residents (Marcuse, 1985).  However, recent papers 
have generally found that gentrifying neighborhoods do not experience higher mobility rates than 
comparable non-gentrifying neighborhoods (Ellen and O’Regan, 2011;Freeman, 2005; McKinnish 
et al., 2010;Vigdor et al., 2002; Martin and Beck, 2018; Ding et al., 2016).  The reason might be 
that gentrification impacts residents in complex ways: on the one hand, residents have strong 
social-attachments to their communities and the appreciation of housing prices could be perceived 
as improving neighborhood characteristics that lead to greater asset values for sale in the future; 
on the other hand, higher housing prices in the previously disadvantaged neighborhoods will 
probably incur greater property taxes that may displace low-income owners.  In real world 
situations, if the displacing force is mitigated then gentrification has weakened links to the 
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displacement of owners.  For example, Martin and Beck (2018)  found that property-tax related 
involuntary moves are not more common in gentrifying neighborhoods than in other communities.  
However, the mechanisms of gentrification also imply that renters would face a higher 
displacement pressure than homeowners because they face the displacing factors of gentrification 
such as rent appreciation but cannot share in the benefits of greater price appreciation.  To date, 
the empirical literature had generally overlooked the potential differences in outcomes between 
owners and renters (Martin and Beck, 2018), thus presenting a gap in the literature.  The owner-
renter displacement incidence also has important policy implications: if the policy goal is to protect 
long-term residents in gentrifying neighborhoods, then policymakers should prioritize stabilizing 
the rental markets.  
 This paper examines the gap in owner/renter displacement incidence from a novel 
perspective of downward mobility.27  Ding et al., 2016 was the first to find that although residents 
with low credit scores and without a mortgage were no more likely to exit gentrifying 
neighborhoods than their counterparts in non-gentrifying neighborhoods, individuals that did move 
out were more likely to move to lower-income neighborhoods.  They also found that the patterns 
differ by gentrification stage and intensity.  These findings showed the importance of investigating 
the quality and destination of residential moves as opposed to solely studying mobility rates. 
However, the data of Ding et al., 2016 did not make a distinction between homeowners and renters, 
thus, they could not directly address the owner-renter incidence gap of gentrification.28  
This study overcomes this limitation by analyzing a large-scale longitudinal dataset, Info 
USA, that contains annual information between 2010-2015 of Chicago households’ location, 
owner/renter status, and characteristics such as household income, household size, and marital 
status.  In the rest of the paper, downward mobility is defined as the movement of a household into 
to a neighborhood with lower median household income than in the origin neighborhood, and the 
incidence of downward mobility is defined as the downward incidence.  The following questions 
                                                 
27 It should be stressed that the concept of downward mobility in this paper only refers to the spatial movement and 
distribution of households. It   should not be confounded with the concept of downward social mobility that is used 
in other social research fields to describe the deterioration of socio-economic conditions of certain households (e.g., 
Newman 1988). 
28 The data of Ding et al., 2016 was collected from individual credits reports with information on credit scores and 
mortgage status. Although owner-renter status was not directly described, the authors did find downward mobility 
was driven by individuals with low credit scores and without mortgages, who are more likely to be renters.  
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motivate the study: 1) Are migrants from gentrifying neighborhoods more likely to experience 
downward mobility than their counterparts from non-gentrifying neighborhoods? 2) Are renter 
migrants, in general, more likely to move to lower-income neighborhoods than owner migrants? 
3) If the answer to question 2) is yes, is the owner-renter incidence gap exacerbated or mitigated 
by the intensity of gentrification in the origin community?    
The initial findings show that the probability of downward mobility increase with 
gentrification for both renters and homeowners.  Specifically, compared with households that 
moved from nongentrifying neighborhoods, households that came from intensely gentrifying 
communities are 5.4 percentage points more likely to move to a destination with lower median 
household income, while such difference does not exist for neighborhoods that underwent low or 
medium gentrification.  Secondly, renters are more likely to experience downward movement than 
owners by 12.2 percentage points, regardless of the gentrification status in the origin community. 
However, there is no evidence that the magnitude of the owner-renter incidence gap changes with 
gentrification intensity.29  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the gentrification-
displacement literature and identifies a literature gap.  Section 3 introduces the InfoUSA dataset 
used in this paper, provides relevant summary statistics, and defines how gentrification is measured. 
Section 4 specifies the empirical approach to systematically investigate owner-renter downward 
incidence across gentrifying/non-gentrifying neighborhoods.  Section 5 discusses the empirical 
results and provides robustness checks using restricted samples or alternative gentrification 
measures.  Section 6 concludes the paper.  
3.2 Literature review 
In theory, gentrification could exacerbate any existing difference in the displacement pressure 
faced by owners and renter for a few reasons.  First, owners do not face the eviction pressure from 
landlords.  Secondly, although gentrification drives up housing prices and property-tax burdens of 
homeowners, the improved neighborhood characteristics will lead to higher sales prices in the 
                                                 
29 It is acknowledged that the empirical analysis of this paper has not addressed the possibility of spatial spillovers of 
gentrification or other neighbourhood characteristics, which might impact the consistency or unbiasedness of the 
estimates. However, as the goal of the paper is to present the existence of owner-renter incidence gap of 
gentrification and bring it to the attention of researchers in the gentrification-displacement field, the potential spatial 
econometric issues will be addressed in follow-up papers. 
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future, incentivizing homeowners to stay.  Moreover, the transaction costs of owners are greater 
than those of renters because it is more difficult to find a home buyer than to find a leasing landlord. 
Thirdly, homeowners generally display more attachment to the neighborhoods, more community 
engagement, and more trust in their neighbors relative to renters (see, for example, Brown et al., 
2003; Fischel, 2001; McCabe, 2012).  Homeowners also have an interest in their neighbors’ 
property values, and this common interest in the value of a place may produce capacity for 
collective action (Logan and Molotch, 2007).  Therefore, the mechanism by which gentrification 
would affect homeowners and renters differ, presenting a potential to aggravate any intrinsic 
difference in the residential mobility between owners and renters.  
The empirical literature of gentrification-displacement to date, however, has mainly 
compared the mobility rates in gentrifying and non-gentrifying neighborhoods and did not find a 
greater likelihood of involuntary out-migration of less disadvantaged households in gentrifying 
neighborhoods (e.g., Freeman, 2005; Ellen and O’Regan, 2011; McKinnish et al., 2010; Vigdor et 
al., 2002).  Martin and Beck (2018) argued that these studies had overlooked the substantial 
differences between homeowners and renters.  Instead, their paper found a renter from gentrifying 
neighborhoods is more likely to move than his/her counterpart from non-gentrifying origins by 2.6 
percentage points - a magnitude comparable or greater than the percentage difference between 
residents of subsidized and unsubsidized units or between a married renter and one who is divorced. 
Owners, by contrast, did not exhibit different residential mobility between the two types of 
neighborhoods according to their results.  
 The present study examines owner-renter displacement incidence from a novel perspective 
of downward mobility.  Although the empirical literature shows that gentrifying neighborhoods 
non-necessarily have higher mobility rates, Newman and Wyly (2006)  argued that gentrification 
reduces the number of housing units that would have been affordable to out-migrants from 
gentrifying neighborhoods.  In other words, gentrification prices out out-migrants from originally 
affordable destinations thus de facto forces them to search for housing in more disadvantaged 
neighborhoods.  Ding et al., 2016 found evidence that gentrification redistributes less advantaged 
residents into less advantaged neighborhoods.  When residents with low-credit scores and without 
mortgages move from gentrifying neighborhoods, they are more likely than their counterparts in 
non-gentrifying neighborhoods to move to a destination community with lower income than their 
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origin community.30   However, their data did not allow a direct distinction between owners and 
renters but had proxied vulnerable renters based on low credit scores and the absence of a mortgage.  
This does not clearly distinguish renters from owners because in the US only 73.2% of low-credit 
score individuals (with Vantage scores below 600) without a mortgage are likely to be renters, and 
specifically, in Philadelphia, about 40% of owner-occupied units do not have a mortgage (Ding et 
al. 2016).  Thus, only approximately two-thirds of the individuals without mortgages in their 
sample are likely renters.  
This paper develops the research of downward mobility by studying how downward 
mobility is related to not only gentrification but also the household’s housing tenure status.  As 
will be discussed in section 3, the dataset used in this study overcomes previous constraints and 
clearly indicates the owner/renter status, thus is more suitable for the investigation of owner-renter 
incidence gap of downward mobility.  
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 The InfoUSA dataset 
This study relies on the panel data InfoUSA that contains annual household-level information of 
residential address and demographic characteristics.  At the national level, InfoUSA covers more 
than 155 million households.  The address data are updated monthly drawing household address 
information from the United States Postal Service National Change of Address (NCOA) database, 
the Locatable Address Coding (LACS) database, and Delivery Point Verification (DPV) database 
to identify probably residential location changes. 31   Household demographic information is 
collected from public records including tax assessor information and deed transfers.  To link 
households records across different years, each household is assigned a unique identification 
                                                 
30 They also did not find higher mobility rates of less advantaged residents from gentrifying neighborhoods, a result 
consistent other major empirical studies of mobility and gentrification such as Freeman, 2005. 
31 Given multiple data sources and methods used to create the InfoUSA dataset, concerns may arise regarding address 
accuracy. The U.S. Census Bureau matched a national sample of InfoUSA data to the Census Bureau Master Address 
File (MAF) to compare data coverage and content accuracy (Kennel and Li, 2009). They estimated that the gross 
national undercoverage rate of InfoUSA data was 15.4 percent at the address level. When measured at the Basic 
Street Address level allowing for more flexibility in address match, the gross national undercoverage rate was 8.4 
percent. For Illinois, the estimated undercoverage rate is 18.8 percent at the address level (Kennel and Li, 2009).  
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number that remains unchanged across the years.  Each entry of the longitudinal dataset reflects 
the household’s characteristics as well as its residential location in December of the year of survey. 
For this study, the residential locations of Chicago households in six years (2010-2015) 
were organized to constitute a longitudinal database.  The major demographic variables include 
the household’s size, marital status, location, owner/renter status, and household income.  To 
discern household moves across neighborhoods, the household address information is augmented 
with the census tract FIPS code in 2010.  Cross-neighborhood moves are identified as those that 
involved moving to a different census tract.32  Then, this dataset of InfoUSA mover households is 
linked with the American Community Survey (ACS) data that contains information about the 
moving household’s origin and destination neighborhoods, such as the neighborhood’s median 
household income, median house value, median gross rent, and average educational attainment.  
The ACS-augmented InfoUSA dataset turns out to be suitable to address the research goals of this 
study.  The community-level variables are first used to identify whether the origin census tract 
underwent gentrification, then to determine if a household had experienced downward movement 
into a destination neighborhood with lower socioeconomic characteristics than the origin 
neighborhood.  The household-level distinction between owners and renters enables the 
investigation of any gap in their incidence of gentrification, with household demographics 
controlled.  
3.3.2 Gentrification measures 
Empirical studies of gentrification do not have a consensus on its definition and its 
operationalization.  By definition, in order for tracts to gentrify, they have to be lower-income and 
have lower housing values at the beginning of the period (Freeman, 2005).  Some of the most 
common metrics relevant to the gentrification process includes increase in median household 
income, increase in share of college-educated residents, as well as housing price/rent appreciation 
(e.g., McKinnish et al., 2010; Ellen and O’Regan, 2011; Freeman, 2005; Ding et al., 2016; Baum-
Snow and Marion, 2009).  To operationalize these definitions, in this study tracts are considered 
to be gentrifiable if they had a median household income below the Chicago median in 2010.  On 
                                                 
32 It should be pointed out that this approach does not identify any inter-regional moves into or out of Chicago.  Only 
households that moved within Chicago are retained in the sample.  
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the other hand, a tract is considered to be gentrifying over a time period if it was gentrifiable at the 
beginning of the time period and experienced both an above citywide median percentage increase 
in its housing prices and an above citywide median increase in its share of college-educated 
residents between 2010-2015.  Either home value or rent reflects the changes in the quality of 
amenities and investments as well as housing affordability in a previously low-income 
neighborhood, but these two prices did not necessarily increase at the same pace. Therefore, 
housing price change are defined as a composite of both.33   The increase in the share of college-
educated residents rather than incomes are incorporated in the metric, because one dimension of 
gentrification features an influx of young professionals who have relatively lower incomes, such 
as artists, but have higher socioeconomic status than incumbent residents (Freeman, 2005).  With 
the criteria defined above, 1,489 nongentrifiable census tracts were identified out of a total of 2,976 
tracts in Chicago.  Among the remaining 1,487 gentrifiable tracts, 491 were gentrifying between 
2010 and 2015.  
The pace and stage of gentrification may affect the likelihood of displacement (Freeman et 
al., 2016).  Gentrifying tracts are classified into three categories (low gentrification, medium 
gentrification, and intense gentrification) based on their respective quartiles of 2010-2015 
gentrification intensity using a definition that puts equal weights on the 2010-2015 changes in 
median housing value and median gross rents34,  following the similar continuous measure used in 
Ding et al.(2016).  Table 3.1 provides a detailed description of these categories. 
 Downward mobility is the movement of households into destination neighborhoods with 
lower socio-demographic status than the origin neighborhoods (Ding et al., 2016).  This study 
identifies downward movement with a binary variable that indicates if the destination tract of a 
moving household has a lower median household income than the origin tract.  The major research 
goals are to investigate the impacts of gentrification, housing tenure status, and their synergy on 
downward mobility.  Figure 3.1 provides initial graphical evidence for the relation between 
gentrification and downward mobility as well as the incidence gap between homeowners and 
                                                 
33 Specifically, a tract’s housing value change is measured by taking the average of its 2010-2015 percentage changes 
in median housing price and median gross rent. For example, if a tract’s median home value in 2015 is twice of its 
2010 home value while its 2015 median gross rent is 1.5 times of the 2010 equivalent, then its composite housing 
value change is 1.75.  
34 In other words, the gentrification measure is gent =  0.5 ∗ [
2015 Median Housing Value
2010 Median Housing Value
+
2015 Median Gross Rent
2010 Median Gross Rent
]. 
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renters.  The horizontal axis is a measure of gentrification intensity in the moving household’s 
origin tract, and the vertical axis is the probability of moving to a destination neighborhood with 
lower median household income (“downward movement”).  The graph is a binned scatter plot of 
average downward mobility in each “bin” of gentrification intensity.  Initially, the continuous 
gentrification measure is divided into 30 brackets, then plot the bin-mean of downward movement 
probability in each bracket.  Figure 3.1 shows that gentrification intensity has a positive correlation 
with a moving households’ downward mobility, then illustrates that at any given gentrification 
intensity, renters consistently have a higher incidence of downward mobility than owners.  The 
figure also displays that the owner-renter incidence gap widens with gentrification intensity, yet 
as will be seen in a later section, this is not the case after confounding covariates in regression 
analysis are controlled.  
Table 3.2 summarizes the neighborhood conditions of gentrifying, nongentrifying, and 
nongentrifiable neighborhoods in Chicago in 2010 and how they had changed between 2010 and 
2015.  In 2010, gentrifying and nongentrifying neighborhoods were comparable in most of the 
characteristics, while nongentrifiable neighborhoods had notably higher median household income, 
housing price, and gross rent than the other two groups.  Furthermore, nongentrifiable 
neighborhoods hosted higher percentages of college-educated residents as well as homeowners, 
and a lower percentage of the housing units that had existed for more than twenty years.  The 
dynamics of neighborhood transformation between 2010-2015 were also distinctive.  For example, 
the most important gentrification indicator, median housing value, depreciated roughly 3% in 
gentrifying neighborhoods but decreased respectively 15% and 10% 
in nongentrified and nongentrifiable tracts.  The gentrifying communities also experienced the 
greatest increases in median household income and the percentage of college-educated residents. 
The demographics of households that moved out of the three types of communities are compared 
in table 3.3.  All households were similar in terms of their length of stay in the previous residence 
and household size. Households from nongentrifying and gentrifying communities were 
comparable in owner-renter composition, married-single composition, and the overall likelihood 
of moving to a destination tract in a lower income quintile, but the latter had higher average 
household income and a younger age composition than the former.  In contrast, movers from 
nongentrifiable communities had a significantly higher household income, older age composition, 
and greater probabilities to be homeowners or married.  This group also had the highest probability 
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to move to a destination community with lower median income, but this is not surprising because 
their origin neighborhoods were in the higher quintiles to begin with.  
3.4 Empirical Approach 
As discussed in section one, three research questions motivate this study of downward mobility: 
are migrants from gentrifying neighborhoods more likely to experience downward movement than 
their counterparts from nongentrifying neighborhoods? Are renters more likely to experience 
downward movement? If a downward incidence gap truly exists between renters and owners, does 
it change with the gentrification intensity in the origin neighborhood? The main empirical 
specification below attempts to answer these questions:  
 
1(Down) = α ∗ gent + β ∗  1(Renter) + γ ∗ gent ∗ 1(Renter) + 𝛉𝐗𝐭 + 𝛟𝐍𝐁𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎 (3.1) 
 
The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether a household’s destination neighborhood is 
in a lower income quintile than the origin neighborhood. The income quintiles are based on the 
median household income of a neighborhood.  Specifically, values 1 to 5 are assigned to each 
origin neighborhood based on the quintile of its 2010 median household income; then, similar 
values of 1 to 5 are assigned to each destination neighborhood based on the quintile of its 2015 
median household income.  A downward movement occurs if a household moved into a destination 
neighborhood with lower value thus lower relative income than the origin neighborhood. The 
probability of downward movement is examined further to see whether it is higher for residents 
from gentrifying neighborhoods than similar residents form nongentrifying neighborhoods. The 
variable 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 is the measure of gentrification intensity in the origin neighborhood and it can take 
on a binary, continuous or categorical form.  Since the regression sample includes migrants from 
both gentrifying and nongentrifying neighborhoods, the coefficient 𝛼  informs whether 
gentrification correlates with downward mobility.  Among all movers from gentrifying 
neighborhoods, renters are expected to be more susceptible to downward pressure associated with 
gentrification because unlike homeowners, renters’ ability to move to other neighborhoods is not 
compensated by housing appreciation in the origin neighborhood.  The variable  𝟏(𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟) is a 
binary indicator that takes the value one for renter households, and the coefficient β quantifies the 
owner-renter incidence gap of downward mobility in terms of likelihood to experience downward 
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movement.  An interaction terms is included for households’ ownership status with the 
gentrification measure of the origin neighborhoods to test whether the owner-renter gap, if any, 
changes with the gentrification intensity in the origin neighborhood.  This effect is quantified by 
𝛾 , the coefficient of the interaction term between 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 and 1(Renter).  Equation (3.1) is a linear 
probability model with an advantage of interpretability when compared with logistic regression 
models that are commonly used for binary dependent variables.  However, to account for 
heteroskedasticity which is intrinsic to linear probability models,35, the White estimator was used 
to derive heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  The unit of analysis is household-year in 
InfoUSA data augmented with neighborhood characteristics from the ACS 2010-2015 5-year 
estimate.   The total number of observations is 39,575 household-years over the period 2010-2015, 
composing of mover households that originated from either gentrifying or nongentrifying-but-
gentrifiable neighborhoods. To check the robustness of the results, regressions are also run on 
subsamples (see section six). 
Using information available in the InfoUSA data, a set of covariates is constructed , 𝐗𝐭 ,to 
control for household features that are found to impact residential mobility by the literature (e.g., 
Crowder et al., 2012; Kan, 1999; Kendig, 1984).  The covariates include the household’s marital 
status and the household head’s age category to account for life cycle factors, the number of 
household members accounting for housing crowding condition, and the household’s income as a 
measure of its financial health reflecting its socioeconomic status.  Regarding neighborhood-level 
covariates in the origin tract, a set of covariates 𝐍𝐁𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎  including median household income, 
median gross rent, median housing value, share of college-educated residents, and homeownership 
rates in the year 2010 for each moving household’s origin tract are further controlled, as the 
literature (e.g., Hwang and Sampson, 2014) suggest that these factors may impact the occurrence 
and intensity of gentrification in a neighborhood.  Table 3.3 shows the means of the covariates by 
the gentrification status of a household's origin tract, from which it could be told that households 
from gentrifying and nongentrifying neighborhoods were comparable.  
                                                 
35 Heteroskedasticity occurs when the variance of the error terms differs with the values of the independent variables. 
In a linear probability model, the variance of the error term is var(e) =  p(1 − p), where p is the probability of 
event occurring. Since p depends on the covariates’ values, heteroskedasticity is intrinsic to linear probability 
models in general thus heteroskedasticity-robust estimators such as White estimator should be used.   
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Admittedly, there are unobserved household and neighborhood characteristics, such as an 
employment change, that may correlate with residential moving decisions that would hinder 
drawing causal inferences from the results of our analysis.  However, the goal here is not to derive 
a causal effect under random treatment assignment but to examine how downward mobility 
patterns correlate with the owner/renter status between gentrifying and nongentrifying 
neighborhoods; in the analysis, care has been taken to control for the most important factors 
associated with residential mobility.  
Past studies have found that the effect of gentrification might be complicated by housing 
booms and busts (Hyra and Rugh, 2016; Ding et al., 2016).  This study used a sample between 
2010 and 2015 which was the recovery period from the most recent housing crisis.  In other words, 
the empirical results of this study are immune to the potential confounding factors if the sample 
straddled two or more periods of one economic cycle, such as from 2008 to 2015.  
3.5 Empirical results  
3.5.1 Overall Incidence of Downward Movement 
Table 3.4 summarizes the regression results of equation (3.1).  Each column in the table 
corresponds to one variation of the model with binary, continuous, or categorical measures of 
gentrification.  First, the results suggest that gentrification impacts downward mobility.  Column 
one shows that households from gentrifying neighborhoods are 1.6 percentage points more likely 
than their counterparts from nongentrifying neighborhoods to experience downward movement. 
Secondly, the other two models further show gentrification intensity matters.  Column two 
indicates that the downward probability increases with the continuous gentrification measure, 
while column three reveals that the results are mainly driven by neighborhoods that underwent 
intense gentrification since the differences are not significant under low or medium gentrification 
intensities.  On average, households from high gentrification neighborhoods, defined as the census 
tracts in the top quartile of gentrification measure, are 5.4 percentage points more likely to 
experience downward movement than households from nongentrifying tracts.  Thirdly, the owner-
renter incidence gap of downward mobility not only exists but has nonnegligible size.  All three 
model variations have similar estimates for the incidence gap: renters on average are 12.2 
percentage points more likely than owners to move to a destination tract with lower median 
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household income.  However, the interaction between gentrification and housing tenure has 
indeterminate signs: column one and two suggest that the owner-renter gap narrows down as 
gentrification intensifies (although significance level of the interaction terms is marginal), while 
column three suggest that the narrowing-down effect concentrates under medium gentrification. 
To provide a comprehensive view of different groups’ downward incidence, table 3.5 sums up the 
coefficients from the first and third column of table 3.4.  Each cell is the comparative downward 
probability of a group relative to the base group of owner migrants from nongentrifying 
neighborhoods.  The results indicate that the synergy of housing tenures and gentrification on 
downward mobility has great variation among different groups.  For example, the downward 
probability of renters coming from high gentrification tracts is 17.6 percentage points higher than 
the base group, while owners from low gentrification communities exhibit no difference with the 
base group.  
3.5.2 Robustness Checks  
To test the robustness of the findings, further analyses were conducted using different subsamples 
and alternative gentrification measures to see how sensitive the results are to different regression 
setups.  Table 3.6 re-runs column three of table 3.4 with four subsamples of renters, owners, 
movers from gentrifying neighborhoods, and movers from nongentrifying neighborhoods.  A few 
findings are confirmed.  First, the owner-renter downward incidence gap is prevalent in either 
gentrifying or nongentrifying neighborhoods.  The fourth column of table 3.6, consisting only of 
observations from nongentrifying tracts, estimates that renters have a 12.2 percentage point higher 
probability than owners to move to a destination neighborhood with lower median income.  This 
is identical to the findings of table 3.4.  Secondly, gentrification intensity impacts downward 
mobility and only intense gentrification matters.  The analysis of column one used only renters 
and identifies an incidence gap of 8 percentage points between renters that came from intense-
gentrification and nongentrifying tracts, while no significant differences exist under low and 
intermediate gentrification.  Column two of table 3.6 finds a similar result for owners except that 
the incidence gap is smaller at a 3.8 percentage point. The sample of column three consists only 
of observations from gentrifying neighborhoods, thus the base group for comparison is owner 
households from low gentrification neighborhoods.  The results again confirm the effects of both 
housing tenure and gentrification on downward mobility.  In column three, renters on average are 
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9.6 percentage points more likely to experience downward movement regardless of the intensity 
of gentrification, while the effect of gentrification only occurs for intensely gentrifying tracts at 
4.9 percentage points.  Thirdly, although the robustness check results mainly agree with the 
baseline findings, it differs in the estimates of the interaction between gentrification and housing 
tenure.  A comparison between column one and column two of table 3.6 suggest that renters are 
more susceptible to intense  gentrification than owners, and a similar result was reported in Martin 
and Beck (2018).  However, the interaction terms in column three of table 3.4 are all insignificant. 
Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to claim that the owner/renter downward incidence gap 
widens or narrows with the intensity of gentrification in the origin tract.  
 Table 3.7 illustrates another set of robustness check using alternative measures of 
gentrification.  The gentrification measure used most prominently in previous analyses has placed 
equal weights on the 2010-2015 changes in median housing value and median gross ren as defined 
in footnote 5.  Three further alternative measures were tested that considered only housing values, 
gross rents, or incorporated the changes in the shares of college-educated residents.  The results in 
table 3.7 are generally consistent with the previous findings. Renters are 12.2 percentage points 
more likely than owners to move to a destination with lower median household income. High 
gentrification imposes a 3.5 to 6.5 percentage-point higher probability of downward movement, 
while low and medium gentrification does not have significant effects.  The coefficients of the 
interaction terms also do not have a consistent interpretation.  
3.6 Conclusion  
The recent development of the gentrification-displacement literature found that although 
gentrifying neighborhoods, in general, do not exhibit elevated mobility rates than nongentrifying 
neighborhoods (Ellen and O’Regan, 2011; Freeman et al., 2016; McKinnish et al., 2010),  
households who did move out from gentrifying neighborhoods, especially intensely gentrifying 
ones, face a higher risk of moving into a destination with lower-socioeconomic status than their 
counterparts from nongentrifying neighborhoods (Ding et al., 2016).  This case study of Chicago 
continues the line of research.  Initially, the relationship between gentrification and downward 
mobility in Chicago is investigated; thereafter, the main contribution to the literature comes from 
establishing if housing tenure status imposes further heterogeneity in downward mobility. 
Specifically, the data constraint of previous studies is overcome by adopting the InfoUSA dataset 
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with records of households’ housing tenure.  It has been revealed that the destinations among 
renters and owners are uneven regardless of the origin neighborhood’s gentrification status.  
Renters on average are 12.2 percentage points more likely than owners to move downward. It has 
also been found that gentrifying neighborhoods in Chicago, especially those undergoing intense 
gentrification, have higher downward mobility rates on average compared with nongentrifying 
neighborhoods. The synergy between gentrification and housing tenure could have sizable impacts 
on the choice of residential destinations.  For example, compared with owners from nongentrifying 
neighborhoods, renters from intensely gentrifying neighborhoods are 17.6 percentage points more 
likely to move to a destination with lower median household income. The findings generally hold 
across various robustness tests with restricted samples or alternative measures of gentrification, 
except the coefficients of the interaction terms between gentrification and housing tenure tend to 
be insignificant.  In other words, there is not enough evidence to conclude that the owner-renter 
incidence gap has a different magnitude in gentrifying neighborhoods than in nongentrifying 
neighborhoods.   
 The paper offers severe]al additional lines for future work.  First, as acknowledged in 
footnote 3, spatial econometric tools are needed to address potential spatial and temporal 
autocorrelation of gentrification as well as other neighborhood features and dynamics.  Secondly, 
empirical analysis should be performed simultaneously on multiple sources, instead of one, in 
order to cross-validate the representativeness of the sample.  Thirdly, the external validity of results 
would be enhanced by a national sample rather than a regional sample. Finally, it would be 
valuable to explore the characteristics of those who did not move to ascertain whether they are 
significantly different from movers. 
Altogether, the findings contribute to debates on gentrification and residential 
displacement by shedding new light on the downward incidence gap between owners and renters, 
and how this difference is exacerbated by gentrification, especially intense gentrification, it should 
be acknowledged that the study is limited in its ability to draw a causal inference and the identified 
relationships are essentially correlations.  However, a correlation relationship still justifies policy 
interventions to address the equity issues related to the different incidence of downward mobility. 
As the synergy between gentrification and housing tenure status redistribute renters to less 
advantaged neighborhoods, policy makers and researchers should pay attention to the detrimental 
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effects of this residential redistribution on local community development and focus on preventing 
and mitigating the relevant negative consequences.  
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3.7 Figure and Tables 
 
Figure 3.1: Bin-scatter Plots of Downward Mobility by Gentrification and Housing Tenure Status 
 
Note: the plot above provides initial graphical evidence for the relation between gentrification and downward mobility as well 
as the incidence gap between homeowners and renters. The horizontal axis is a measure of gentrification intensity in the moving 
household’s origin tract, and the vertical axis is the probability to move to a destination neighborhood with lower median 
household income (“downward movement”). The graph is a binned scatter plot of average downward mobility in each “bin” of 
gentrification intensity. It first divides the continuous gentrification measure into 30 brackets, then plots the bin-mean of 
downward movement probability in each bracket.  
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Table 3.1: Definition of Categorical Gentrification Measure 
 
Categories # of tracts Explanation 
nongentrifiable nongentrifiable 1,489 Nongentrifiable tracts by 2010 characteristics 
Gentrifiable Nongentrifying 996 
Had a median income less than the Chicago 
median in 2010 
Gentrifying  491 Gentrifiable but also experienced above city-
median increases in: 1. the share of college-
educated residents 2. median housing value or 
median gross rent between 2010-2015 
 
low gentrification 123 
gentrifying but in the bottom quartile of 
gentrifying tracts for the increases in housing 
prices and rent between 2010-2015 
 
Medium 
gentrification 
244 
gentrifying but in the 2nd and 3rd quartile of 
gentrifying tracts for the increases in housing 
prices and rent between 2010-2015 
 
Intense gentrification 124 
gentrifying but in the top quartile of gentrifying 
tracts for the increases in housing prices and rent 
between 2010-2015 
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Note: the source of above summary statistics is the 5-year estimates of 2010-2015 American Community Survey (ACS). A total of 
147 tracts, or 4.7% of a total 3,123 census tracts in Chicago, were excluded because of missing information of one or more variables.  
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3.2: Neighborhood Characteristics by Gentrification Class 
 Nongentrifiable NonGentrifying Gentrifying 
Count 1489 996 491 
Initial Neighborhood Conditions in 2010 
Med Housing Value ($) 289361 157764 142604 
Med Gross Rent ($) 1032 748 679 
% of College Educated 27.04% 11.28% 11.03% 
Med Household Income ($) 75152 37859 37900 
% of Owner 77.4% 55.9% 58.0% 
% of Houses>20 Years 75.1% 89.5% 86.9% 
Changes in Census Tract Features between 2010-2015 
% Change in Housing Value 89.8% 85.4% 96.8% 
% Change in Gross Rent 114% 107% 114% 
% Change in College Educated 1.8% -0.5% 4.3% 
% Change in Household Income 103% 104% 111% 
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Table 3.3: Mover Household Profiles by Gentrification Class 
 Nongentrifiable NonGentrifying Gentrifying 
Count 135494 29289 10286 
Household Income ($) 117545 74325 83731 
Household Size 2.270 2.174 2.140 
% Owner  89.0% 75.9% 75.5% 
Previous Length of Stay (Year) 8.58 8.40 7.62 
% of Married 94.3% 85.9% 86.1% 
% of Downward Move 25.2% 10.4% 9.5% 
% of < 35  years old 23.6% 28.2% 30.7% 
% of 35-65  years old 63.9% 61.1% 59.7% 
% of  > 65  years old 12.5% 10.7% 9.6% 
Note: the source of above summary statistics is the 5-year estimates of 2010-2015 American Community Survey (ACS) 
and the subset of InfoUSA data that includes mover households.  
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Table 3.4: The Relationship of Downward Mobility with Gentrification and Housing Tenure 
Status in Chicago between 2010-2015 
 Dependent variable: 
 Dummy:Downward 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Gentrifying (Binary) 0.016***   
 (0.003)   
Gentrification (Continuous)  0.019***  
  (0.003)  
Low Gentrification   -0.001 
   (0.006) 
Medium Gentrification   0.007* 
   (0.004) 
Intense Gentrification   0.054*** 
   (0.006) 
Renter Dummy 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Renter*Gentrifying(Dummy) -0.016*   
 (0.009)   
Renter*Gentrifying(cnts)  -0.016*  
  (0.009)  
Renter*Low Gentrification   -0.022 
   (0.016) 
Renter*Medium Gentrification   -0.022* 
   (0.012) 
Renter*Intense Gentrification   -0.001 
   (0.017) 
Observations 39,575 39,575 39,575 
Adjusted R2 0.114 0.114 0.115 
Note: The goal of the table is to estimate the effects of gentrification and housing status on downward mobility. 
The included covariates are discussed in section 3, plus year fixed effects. Each column respectively has binary, 
continuous and categorical gentrification measure, and White estimator that is robust to heteroskedasticity has 
been used to adjust the inference and significance levels of the coefficients. 
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Table 3.5: Comparative Probability of Downward Movement 
 Owner Renter 
Nongentrifying - 12.2% 
Gentrifying (Binary) 1.6% 10.6% 
Low gentrification 0.0% 12.2% 
Medium gentrification 0.7% 10.7% 
Intense gentrification 5.4% 17.6% 
Note: the base group of comparison is owner from nongentrifying neighborhoods. The 
calculation is based on summing coefficients from table 3.4 where downward incidence was 
estimated.  
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Table 3.6: Robustness Check on Downward Mobility with Restricted Samples 
 Dependent variable: 
 Dummy:Downward 
 Renter Owner Gentrifying Nongentrifying 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Renter Dummy   0.096*** 0.122*** 
   (0.013) (0.004) 
Low Gentrification -0.011 -0.004   
 (0.015) (0.006)   
Med Gentrification -0.009 0.003 0.009  
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.008)  
Intense Gentrification 0.080*** 0.038*** 0.049***  
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.009)  
Renter*Med Gentrification   0.005  
   (0.016)  
Renter*Intense Gentrification   0.029  
   (0.018)  
Observations 9,578 29,997 10,286 29,289 
Adjusted R2 0.209 0.054 0.111 0.118 
Note: each column has the same empirical specification as the 3rd column of table 3.4 with categorical gentrification 
measures but differs in the sample of regression. The goal is to test whether the estimated effects in table 3.4 is robust 
under restricted samples.   
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Table 3.7: Robustness Check on Downward Mobility with Alternative Gentrification Measures 
 Dependent variable: 
 Dummy:Downward 
 MHV MGR EDU 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Renter Dummy 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Renter*Low Gentrification 0.003 -0.064*** -0.023* 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Renter*Medium Gentrification -0.005 -0.012 -0.022** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Renter*Intense Gentrification -0.059*** 0.025* 0.0005 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Low Gentrification -0.008 0.030*** -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Med Gentrification 0.005 -0.003 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Intense Gentrification 0.065*** 0.035*** 0.061*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Observations 39,575 39,575 39,575 
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.115 0.116 
Note: each column has the same empirical specification as the 3rd column of table 3.4 with categorical gentrification 
measures but differs in their definitions of gentrification. The goal is to test whether the estimated effects in table 3.4 
is robust under alternative measures of gentrification.  
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